Launch Of The Quit India Movement 1942
‘Bharat Choro,' ‘Quit India.' This simple but powerful slogan signalled the start of "the legendary struggle" that became known as the "August Revolution." The common people of the country displayed unrivalled heroism and militancy during this conflict. Furthermore, the repression they were subjected to was the harshest ever used against a national movement. The circumstances in which the resistance was offered were also the most difficult faced by the national movement up to that point — the government had armed itself with draconian measures and suppressed even basic civil liberties under the guise of the war effort. For one thing, the failure of the Cripps Mission in April 1942 demonstrated that Britain was unwilling to offer an honourable settlement and a genuine constitutional advance during the war, and that she was adamant about continuing India's unwilling cooperation in the war effort.
• The empty gesture of even those Congressmen like Nehru and Gandhiji, who did not want to do anything to sabotage the anti-fascist War effort that any further silence would be tantamount to accepting the British Government's right to decide India's fate without any reference to the wishes of the people, that any further silence would be tantamount to accepting the British Government's Gandhiji, like Nehru, had stated unequivocally that he did not wish to obstruct the anti-fascist struggle, particularly that of the Russian and Chinese peoples.
• However, by the spring of 1942, he was increasingly convinced that a struggle was unavoidable. Gandhiji drafted a resolution for the Congress Working Committee a fortnight after Cripps' departure, calling for Britain's withdrawal and the adoption of nonviolent non-cooperation against any Japanese invasion.

• Congress moved closer to Quit India, while Britain moved closer to arming herself with special powers to counter the threat. Until August 1942, Nehru was adamantly opposed to the idea of a struggle, yielding only at the very end.
• Other factors, aside from British obstinacy, made a struggle both inevitable and necessary. People were becoming increasingly dissatisfied, as a result of rising prices and wartime shortages. High-handed government actions, such as the seizure of boats in Bengal and Orissa to prevent them from being used by the Japanese, had sparked widespread public outrage.
• The growing fear of a British collapse fuelled the public's desire to express their discontent. The news of Allied reversals and British withdrawals from Southeast Asia and Burma, as well as the trains transporting wounded soldiers from the Assam-Burma border, only confirmed this feeling. This was compounded by the impact of the British evacuation from Malaya and Burma.
• The British had evacuated the white residents and left the subject people to their fate, it was common knowledge. Letters from Indians in Southeast Asia to relatives in India were filled with graphic accounts of British betrayal and being abandoned to the dreaded Japanese. Isn't it reasonable to expect them to repeat the performance in India in the event of a Japanese occupation?
• In fact, one of the main reasons why the national movement's leaders felt it was necessary to start a struggle was that they believed the people were becoming demoralised and that, in the event of a Japanese occupation, they might not resist at all.
• In order to build up their capacity to resist Japanese aggression, it was necessary to draw them out of this demoralised state of mind and persuade them of the importance of resisting Japanese aggression.
• Gandhiji was emphatic on this point, as he always was. People withdrew deposits from post-office savings accounts and began hoarding gold, silver, and coins as public confidence in British rule had plummeted. This was especially noticeable in East Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, but it also occurred in the Madras Presidency
• He did not have to carry out his threat, and the Congress, as before, heeded the Mahatma's expert advice on the best time to launch a mass movement. Though Gandhiji had been talking about the coming struggle for some time, the Congress first accepted the idea of a struggle at the Wardha Working Committee meeting on July 14, 1942.
• In August, the All-India Congress Committee was scheduled to meet in Bombay to ratify the decision. The public enthusiasm generated at the historic August meeting at Gowalia Tank in Bombay was unprecedented.
• As the leaders debated the issue, large crowds gathered outside. And the sense of anticipation and expectation was so strong that there was pin-drop silence in the open session when the leaders gave their speeches in front of the thousands who had gathered to hear them.
• Gandhiji's speech, delivered in his usual quiet and un-rhetorical style, had the most electrifying impact, according to many in the audience.
• He began by emphasising that "the actual struggle does not begin at this time." You have only placed all your powers in my hands. I will now wait upon the Viceroy a’ plead with him for the acceptance of the Congress demand. That process is likely to take two or three weeks.’ ‘You may take it from me that I will not strike a bargain with the Viceroy for ministries and the like,' he added. I will not be satisfied with anything less than complete liberty. Maybe, he will propose the abolition of salt tax, the drink evil, etc. But I will say: “Nothing less than freedom.”’
• He concluded with the now-famous exhortation, "Do or Die." To quote: ‘Here is a mantra, a short one that I give you. You may imprint it on your hearts and let every breath of yours give expression to it. The mantra is. “Do or Die” We shall either free India or die in the attempt: we shall not live to see the perpetuation of our slavery.’
• Gandhiji's speech also included specific instructions for various segments of the audience. Soldiers were not to leave their posts, but they were to "refuse to fire on our own people."
• Government employees would not be asked to resign, but they should openly declare their allegiance to the Congress. Instead of paying homage to a foreign power, the Princes were told to "accept the sovereignty of your own people." The people of the Princely States were also asked to declare that they "were" a part of the Indian nation and "would accept the leadership of the Princes if they cast their lot with the People, but not otherwise."
• Students were to drop out of school if they were confident in their ability to maintain firm independence. On August 7, Gandhiji presented the Waking Committee with the instructions he had drafted, in which he proposed that peasants "who have the courage, and are willing to risk their all" refuse to pay the land revenue.
• ‘The Congress holds that the land belongs to those who work on it and no one else,' tenants were told. If the zamindar makes common cause with the ryot in a zamindari system, his share of the revenue, which can be settled by mutual agreement, should be given to him. However, if a zamindar chooses to support the government, he should not be taxed.' Although these instructions were not issued in response to the preventive arrests, they do reveal Gandhiji's intentions.
• The government, on the other hand, had no intention of negotiating with Congress or waiting for the movement to be formally launched. All of the congress' top leaders were arrested and taken to unknown locations in a single sweep in the early hours of August 9.
• The government had been preparing for the strike since the beginning of the war, and had an elaborate Revolutionary Movement Ordinance in place since 1940.
• In a personal letter to the governors on August 8, 1940, Viceroy Linlithgow stated his intentions: ‘I feel very strongly that the only possible response to a ‘declaration of war' by any section of Congress in the present circumstances must be a declared determination to crush the organisation for a while.'
Gandhiji had carefully built up the tempo through the Individual Civil Disobedience Movement, organisational revamping, and a consistent propaganda campaign for two years, avoiding the trap set for him by refusing to make a rash and premature strike. The government, on the other hand, was no longer willing to give him any more time to carry out his plan. Instructions for arrests and suppression had gone out to the provinces in anticipation of the AICC passing the Quit India resolution.