Role Of Indian Capitalists In The National Movement

Several individual capitalists joined the Congress among the various groups that participated in the national movement. They were fully committed to the cause, went to jail, and accepted the hardships that Congressmen faced during the colonial period. In this regard, the names Jamnalal Bajaj, Vadilal Lallubhai Mehta, Samuel Aaron, Lala Shankar Lal, and others are well known. Other individual capitalists did not join the Congress but generously contributed financial and other resources to the movement. This includes people like G.D. Birla, Ambalal Sarabhai, and Waichand Hirachand. A large number of smaller traders and merchants also came out in active support of the national movement at various times. On the other hand, there were a few individual capitalists or sections of the class who were either neutral or actively opposed to the Congress and the national movement. 

 

•    First, starting around the mid-nineteenth century, the Indian capitalist class grew with a largely independent capital base, rather than as junior partners of foreign capital or compradors. 

 

•    Second, the capitalist class as a whole was not economically or politically bound to pro-imperialist feudal interests. In fact, in 1944-45, Purshottamdas Thakurdas, J.R.D. Tata, G.D. Birla, Ardeshir Dalal, Sri Ram, Kasturbhai Lalbhai, A.D. Shroff, and John Mathai argued for comprehensive land reform, including cooperative production, finance, and marketing in their famous Bombay plan (signatories: Purshottamdas Thakurdas, J.R.D. Tata.

 

•    Third, the capitalist class grew rapidly from 1914 to 1947, increasing its strength and self-confidence. This was primarily accomplished through import substitution, edging out or encroaching on areas of European dominance, and establishing nearly exclusive control over new areas, accounting for the majority of new investments made since the 1920s. 

 

•    Within a few years of independence, indigenous businesses had already seized 72% to 73% of the domestic market and over 80% of the deposits in the organised banking sector. This growth, unusual for a colonial capitalist class, did not, contrary to popular belief, occur as a result or by-product of colonialism or as a result of a decolonization policy. 

 

•    There was thus nothing in the Indian capitalists' class position or economic interests that, contrary to popular belief, prevented them from opposing imperialism. Indeed, by the mid-twentieth century, Indian capitalists had begun to recognise their long-term class interests and felt strong enough to take a consistent and openly anti-imperialist stance. 

 

•    The class's hesitancy was not in its opposition to imperialism, but in deciding which path to take in the fight against imperialism. It was obvious that the path chosen should not be one that, while opposing imperialism, would jeopardise its own survival, i.e., undermine capitalism.

 

Capitalist class's position in relation to imperialism and the course of the anti-imperialist movement: Various capitalists, such as G.D. Birla and Purshottamdas Thakurdas, have been attempting to establish a national level organisation of Indian commercial, industrial, and financial interests (as opposed to the already relatively more organised European interests in India) to be able to effectively lobby the colonial government since the early 1920s. 

 

Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI): It was formed in 1927 with a large and rapidly growing membership from all over India. 

•    The British government, as well as the Indian public in general, quickly recognised the FICCI as representing the dominant opinion and overall consensus within the Indian capitalist class.

 

•    The leaders of the capitalist class clearly saw the FICCI as "national guardians of trade, commerce, and industry," performing the functions of a national government in the economic sphere in colonial India. 

 

•    In the process, Indian capitalists developed a fairly comprehensive economic critique of imperialism in all its manifestations, whether it is direct appropriation through home charges or exploitation through trade, finance, currency manipulation, or foreign investments, including the now fashionable concept of unequal distribution of wealth.

 

•    The FICCI, on the other hand, was not to be merely a trade union for the capitalist class fighting for its own economic demands as well as those of the nation. The capitalist class's leaders now clearly see the need for the class to intervene in politics, and they believe they are strong enough to do so. ‘We can no longer separate our politics from our economics,' declared Sir Purshottamdas, President of FICCI.

 

As previously stated, the Indian capitalist class had its own ideas about how the anti-imperialist struggle should be carried out. It was always in favour of not completely abandoning the constitutional path and the negotiating table, preferring instead to support constitutional forms of struggle over mass civil disobedience. This was due to a number of factors.

 

•    First, there was concern that mass civil disobedience, particularly if it lasted a long time, would unleash forces that would turn the movement revolutionary in a social sense (i.e., threaten capitalism itself). As Laiji Naranji wrote to Purshottamdas in March 1930, “private property” could be jeopardised, and the resulting “disregard for authority” could have serious consequences. Even for the "future government of Swaraj," there will be "disastrous aftereffects." When the movement appeared to be becoming too dangerous in this regard, the capitalists tried everything they could to return it to a state of constitutional opposition.

 

•    Second, the capitalists were unwilling to support a sustained all-out war against the government of the time because it hampered day-to-day business and threatened the class's very existence.

 

•    Indian capitalists' support for constitutional participation, whether in assemblies, conferences, or even joining the Viceroy's Executive Council, should not be interpreted as co-opting or surrendering to the imperial system. They saw all of this as a forum for maintaining effective opposition, fearing that boycotting these forums entirely would allow ‘black legs' and elements that did not represent the nation to easily pass measures that would severely harm the Indian economy and capitalist class without any opposition. However, unconditionally accepting reforms or participating in conferences or assemblies was not an option. 

 

•    Capitalists were to "participate on their own terms," with "no compromise on fundamentals," firmly rejecting offers of cooperation that fell short of their own and national minimum demands. The FICCI rejected the ‘Report of the Joint Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms for India' in 1934 on this basis, calling it “even more reactionary than the proposals contained in the White Paper.”

 

•    Furthermore, however eager the capitalists were to keep constitutional avenues open, they clearly recognised the futility of entering councils, etc., “unless the nation also decides to enter them,” as FICCI President N.R. Sarkar noted in 1934. They also refused to negotiate with the British government, and especially to make any final commitments, on constitutional or economic issues, behind the Congress's back, i.e., without its participation or, at the very least, approval. 

 

•    In 1930, the FICCI (in sharp contrast to the Liberals) advised its members to boycott the Round Table Conference (RTC) stating that no conference convened for the purpose of discussing the problem of Indian constitutional advance can come to a solution . . . unless such a conference is attended by Mahatma Gandhi, as a free man, or has at least his approval.” This was partly due to the capitalists' desire for India to present a united front at the RTC, and partly due to the fact that they knew only the Congress could deliver the goods. 

 

•    ‘Without the support of the Congress, the government will not listen to you,' Ambalal Sarabhai said in November 1929. 

 

•    Finally, it should be noted that constitutionalism was not an end in itself for the capitalist class, nor did it subscribe to what has been referred to as "gradualism," in which case it would have allied with the Liberals rather than supporting the Congress, which repeatedly engaged in non-constitutional struggle, including mass civil disobedience. 

 

View on CDM: The capitalist class did not rule out other forms of struggle, seeing constitutional participation as merely a first step toward a goal that may require additional steps. This brings us to the Indian capitalists' complicated attitude toward mass civil disobedience. 

 

•    While they were wary of long-term mass civil disobedience, they also recognised the utility, if not necessity, of civil disobedience in obtaining crucial concessions for their class and the nation. In January 1931, he made a remark about the Civil Disobedience Movement at the time. G.D. Birla wrote to Purshottamdas, ‘There could be no doubt that what we are being offered at present is entirely due to Gandhiji. . . if we are to achieve what we desire, the present movement should not be allowed to slacken.”

 

•    When the capitalists sought the withdrawal of the mass movement and a compromise (often mediating between the Government and Congress to secure peace) after the movement had gone on for a long time, they made it clear that they would only do so after extracting definite concessions, using the movement, or the threat of re-launching it, to bargain. They were not to surrender or ‘reduce (their) demands' in their ‘anxiety for peace.' 

 

•    Furthermore, no matter how opposed the capitalist class was to mass civil disobedience at one point in time, it never supported the colonial government in suppressing it. Even when the Congress was in the midst of its non-constitutional mass phase, capitalists pressed the government to end repression, lift the ban on the Congress and the press, release political prisoners, and end arbitrary rule with ordinances as a first step to any settlement. 

 

•    Fear of Congress militancy or radicalization did not compel capitalists (especially after the late 1920s) to either support imperialism in its repression or openly condemn or dissociate them from it.

 

•    The capitalists opposed the boycott agitation during the Swadeshi Movement (1905-08). Even during the early twentieth century's Non-Cooperation Movement, a small group of capitalists, including Purshottamdas, openly declared themselves enemies of the movement. 

 

•    During the Civil Disobedience Movement of the 1930s, however, the capitalists largely supported the movement and refused to respond to the Viceroy's exhortations (in September 1930) to publicly repudiate the Congress position and his offer of full government protection against any harassment for doing so. 

 

•    Purshottamdas believed that, given the British government's political stance, the Congress had no choice but to launch non-cooperation in September 1940. 20 Purshottamdas, J.R.D. Tata, and G.D. Birla wrote to the Viceroy on August 5, 1942, four days before the launch of the Quit India Movement, that the only solution to the current crisis, the successful execution of the war, and the prevention of another civil disobedience movement was "granting political freedom to the country... even during the midst of war."

 

•    Though the dominant section of the Indian capitalist class began to support the Congress by the late 1920s, the Indian national movement was not created, led, or in any way decisively influenced by this class, nor was it in any way critically dependent on its support. 

 

•    The capitalist class, in fact, was the one who reacted to the existing autonomous national movement by constantly trying to devise a strategy for dealing with it. Furthermore, while the capitalist class stayed in the nationalist camp (rather than aligning with the loyalists), it did so at the most conservative end of the nationalist spectrum, which did not call the shots of the national movement at any point.

 

•    However, the relative autonomy of the Indian national movement has been repeatedly denied, and it has been claimed that capitalists were able to pressurise the Congress into making demands that allegedly benefited only their class, such as a lower Rupee-to-Sterling ratio, tariff protection, and a reduction in military expenditure. 

 

•    Furthermore, it is claimed that the capitalists were able to exert decisive influence over the Congress's political course, even deciding whether a movement should be launched, continued, or withdrawn. The Gandhi-Irwin Pact, which ended civil disobedience in 1931, and the non-launch of another movement between 1945 and 1947 are two examples given.

 

•    First, an economic nationalism programme vis-à-vis imperialism, with demands for protection, fiscal and monetary autonomy, and the like, did not represent the interests of just the capitalist class; it represented the demands of the entire nation subject to imperialist exploitation. Even the leftists — Nehru, the Socialists, and the Communists — had to fight for these demands in their fight against imperialism. 

 

•    Second, early nationalism developed the doctrine of economic nationalism in great detail nearly half a century before Indian capitalists were organised as a class and entered the political arena to fight for these demands. So there was no way the capitalist class could have bought, manipulated, or pressured the Congress into these positions.

 

•    Third, while the Congress did require and accept funds from the business community, particularly during constitutional (election) periods. There is no evidence that the businessmen were able to influence the party's policy and ideology in any way through these funds in any way that was not acceptable to the party on its own. Even the Congress's reliance on funds has been grossly exaggerated (back when it was a popular movement). 

 

•    During non-election periods, the vast majority of Congress cadres supported themselves and carried on day-to-day agitations with funds raised from membership dues and small donations. In this context, Gandhiji's stance on capitalist support is very telling. While welcoming and even appealing for merchants and mill owners' support as early as 1922, he also maintained that, "whether they do so or not, the country's march to freedom cannot be made to depend on any corporation or groups of men." This is a large-scale event. 

 

•    The masses are rapidly approaching deliverance, and they must move whether with or without the help of organised capital. As a result, this must be a movement that is both independent of and complementary to capital. Only if capital came to the masses' aid would it be to the capitalists' credit and hasten the arrival of the happy day.' (Gandhiji's attitude toward capitalists hardened over time, particularly during World War II, when a large number of them were busy profiteering while the national movement faced untold repression and the people faced food shortages and famines.)

 

•    Finally, there is little evidence to support the claim that capitalists determine the course of Congress-led movements (many of which are led or supported by socialists and communists in specific areas). 

 

•    The growing radicalization of the Congress to the left in the 1930s, with the growing influence of Nehru and the Socialists and Communists within the Congress, that prompted the capitalists to become more active in politics. 

 

•    The capitalists were not pushed into the "lap of imperialism" by the fear of radicalization of the national movement, as predicted by contemporary radicals and as happened in some other colonial and semi-colonial countries. 

 

•    Instead, Indian capitalists devised a deft, multi-pronged strategy to contain the Left, none of which included selling out to imperialism or imperial interests. For example, when certain capitalists attempted to form a class party combining European and Indian capitalists in response to the high level of Communist activity among the trade unions in 1929, the leaders of the capitalist class firmly quashed such a move.

 

•    Similarly, in 1928, the capitalists refused to support the government's introduction of the Public Safety Bill, which was designed to contain the Communists, claiming that such a provision would be used to attack the national movement.

 

•    Furthermore, the capitalists were not to try to ‘kill Bolshevism and Communism with such frail weapons as frontal attacks on the Left with their class organisations, which would have no clout among the ‘masses' or even the ‘middle classes.' "I have not the slightest doubt in my mind that a purely capitalist organisation is the last body to put up an effective fight against communism," Birla said. 

 

•    Later (in 1936), when Nehru's leftist stance was seen as a threat, he argued that "letting those who have given up property say what you want to say" was a far superior method. The strategy was to ‘strengthen the hands' of nationalists whose ideology did not go beyond the confines of capitalism or, better yet, opposed socialism.

 

•    As FICCI president G.L. Mehta argued in 1943, capitalists also realised that "a consistent... programme of reforms" was the most effective remedy against social upheavals. The ‘Post War Economic Development Committee,' established by capitalists in 1942, and which eventually drafted the Bombay Plan, was to function with this reform perspective. Its goal was to incorporate "everything that is sound and feasible in the socialist movement" and see "how far socialist demands could be accommodated without capitalism losing any of its essential features." 

 

•    As a result, the Bombay Plan took the issue of rapid economic growth and equitable distribution seriously, even advocating for partial nationalisation, the public sector, land reform, and a number of worker welfare schemes. It's worth noting that the Bombay planners' basic assumption was that the plan could only be implemented by an independent national government.

 

The Indian capitalist class was unmistakably anti-socialist and bourgeois, but not pro-imperialist. The Indian capitalist class's maturity in identifying long-term interests, correctly understanding the nature of the Congress and its relationship with the various classes in Indian society, its refusal to abandon the side of Indian nationalism even when threatened by the Left or tempted by imperialism, and its ability to project its own class interests as societal interests are just a few of the traits that the Indian capitalist class possesses.