Role Of The British In Partition Of India

The contradictory nature of the reality of August 15, 1947 continues to fascinate historians and torment people on both sides of the border. After long, glorious years of struggle, a hard-won, prized freedom was achieved, but the emerging free nation was ripped apart by a bloody, tragic Partition.

 

•    There are two concerns. Why did the British decide to leave? Why did the Congress agree to Partition?

 

•    The imperialist response is that independence was simply Britain's self-appointed mission to assist the Indian people in achieving self-government. Partition was an unintended consequence of the long-standing Hindu-Muslim schism, the failure of the two communities to agree on how and to whom power should be transferred. 

 

•    The radical view is that the mass actions of 1946-47, in which many Communists participated, often as leaders, finally wrested independence. However, fearful of the revolutionary upsurge, the bourgeois leaders of the Congress struck a deal with imperialist power in which power was transferred to them and the nation paid the price of Partition. These appealing visions of noble design or revolutionary intent frustrated by traditional religious conflict or worldly profit blur rather than illuminate the bleak reality. 

 

In fact, the success-failure dichotomy of the anti-imperialist movement led by the Congress is reflected in the Independence-Partition duality. 

 

1.    Forming a nation out of disparate classes, communities, groups, and regions, and securing independence from the British rulers. 

 

2.    While the Congress was successful in raising nationalist consciousness to the point where it could put pressure on the British to leave India, it was unable to complete the task of uniting the country, particularly in integrating Muslims. This contradiction — the national movement's success and failure — is mirrored in the other contradiction — independence, but with it Partition.

 

By the end of the war, it was clear that the nationalist forces had won the battle for hegemony over Indian society. The British rulers had defeated Hitler in the war, but they had lost the war in India. The national movement occupied a much larger area than the Raj's shadow cast. 

 

•    Previously unpoliticized areas and apolitical groups had joined the rest of the country in protesting the INA trials. Men in the armed forces and the bureaucracy openly attended meetings, contributed money, voted for the Congress, and let it be known that they were doing so.

 

•    The politicized sections' militancy was evident in the heroic actions of 1942, as well as the bravery with which students and others expressed their solidarity with INA and RIN men. The nationalist movement's success could be plotted on a graph of swelling crowds, broad reach, and deep intensity of nationalist sentiment and public fervor. 

 

•    A corresponding graph of British officials' demoralization and changing loyalties of Indian officials and loyalists could be drawn, which would tell the same story of nationalist success, but in a different way. In this story, nationalism does not appear to be a powerful force that leaves no room for the British. Rather, it would demonstrate how the national movement eroded imperialist hegemony, gnawed at the colonial structure's pillars, and reduced British political strategy to a jumble of inconsistencies.' 

 

•    It's worth noting that British rule was maintained in part thanks to the consent or at least acquiescence of large segments of the Indian population. The colonial regime's social base was among the zamindars and upper classes, the so-called "loyalists," who received the lion's share of British favours and positions. These were the Indians who ran the government, supported government policy, and implemented the reforms that the British reluctantly and belatedly implemented. 

 

•    The British also gained the people's consent to their rule by convincing them to believe in British justice and fairness, accept the British officer as the mai-baap of his people, and recognize Pox Britannica’s dominance. 

 

•    Few people truly believed in the ‘Angrezi Raj ki Barkaten,' but the British were content if people were impressed by the Raj's steadfastness and concluded that its foundations were unshakeable. 

 

The Raj was built on prestige, and the district officer who belonged to the Indian Civil Service (ICS), the "heaven-born service" that was dubbed "the steel frame of the Raj," was the embodiment of that prestige.

 

•    Early in the First World War, a lack of European recruits to the ICS, combined with an Indianization policy (partly conceded in response to popular demand), put an end to British dominance of the ICS. By 1939, the number of British and Indian members had equalized. To maintain this balance, overall recruitment was cut at first, and then stopped in 1943. 

 

•    The total number of ICS officials fell from 1201 to 939 between 1940 and 1946, with British ICS officials falling from 587 to 429 and Indian ICS officials falling from 614 to 510. Only 19 British ICS officials were available in Bengal in 1946, for a total of 65 positions.

 

•    Furthermore, the men arriving were no longer Oxbridge graduates from aristocratic families whose fathers and uncles were "old India hands" who believed it was the British nation's destiny to govern India's "child-people."

 

•    It was becoming increasingly common for grammar school and polytechnic boys to see serving the Raj as a career rather than a mission. The problem had been exacerbated by the war. By 1945, war fatigue had set in, and long absences from home had taken their toll on morale. 

 

•    Concerns about the economy had arisen as a result of inflation. Many were set to retire, while others were expected to retire early. It was a war-weary, depleted bureaucracy that remained, battered by the 1942 movement. 

 

•    However, much more than a lack of manpower, the ICS and the Raj were crippled by the emergence of contradictions in the British counter-nationalist strategy. To contain the growing national movement, the British had relied on a dual policy of conciliation and repression over the years. 

 

However, after the Cripps Offer of 1942, there was little left to offer as a concession other than a transfer of power — complete freedom. However, the national movement's strategy of a multi-faceted struggle combining nonviolent mass mobilization with practical constitutional reforms proved to be more than a match for them. 

 

•    When nonviolent movements were met with repression, the government's naked force was exposed; on the other hand, if the government did not crack down on "sedition," or reached a truce (as in 1931 when the Gandhi-Irwin Pact was signed), or conceded provincial autonomy under the Government of India Act 1935, it was seen as too weak to wield control, and its authority and prestige were undermined. 

 

•    On the other hand, both liberals and loyalists were offended by the brutal repression of the 1942 movement. The government's refusal to release Gandhi, even when he appeared to be on the verge of death during his 21-day fast in February-March 1943, and its decision to proceed with the INA trials despite fervent pleas from liberals and loyalists to stop them, both contributed to his death. When the British government appeared to be appeasing its enemies, such as in 1945-46, when it was thought that the government was wooing the Congress into a settlement and joining the government, the British friends were outraged. 

 

•    Loyalists were dismayed by the powerlessness of those in positions of authority. While the violence of Congress speeches rent the air, officials stood by. The loyalists' faith in the ‘Raj's' power was shaken by this. If the loyalists' problem was one of faith, the military's problem was one of action. Only if policy was clear — repression or conciliation, not both — could action be decisive. 

 

When the same officials had to implement both policy poles, the policy mix was bound to cause problems. This conundrum first arose in the mid-1930s, when officials were concerned about the prospect of popular ministries, because the Congressmen they had repressed during the Civil Disobedience Movement were likely to become their political masters in the provincial Ministries. In eight provinces, this possibility quickly became a reality.

 

•    Constitutionalism, like the mass movement before it, wreaked havoc on military morale, though this is rarely acknowledged. If mass nonviolent action exorcised fear of authority, confidence was gained as a result of the ‘Congress Raj.' 

 

•    People couldn't help but notice that the British Chief Secretary in Madras began wearing khadi, and that the Revenue Secretary in Bombay, on tour with the Revenue Minister, Morarji Desai, would dash across the railway platform from his first-class compartment to the latter's third-class carriage so that the Honourable Minister would not be delayed. 

 

•    Although there was no evidence of disloyalty among Indian officials, ‘it was the one thing to parade one's patriotism and, if possible, a third cousin twice removed who had been imprisoned in the civil disobedience movement.' 

 

•    Most importantly, officials began to consider the possibility of Congress regaining power when dealing with subsequent congressional agitations. There was no refusal to carry out orders, but in some places, this consideration led to half-hearted action against the individual disobedience movement in Uttar Pradesh in 1940, and even against the East UP and Bihar rebels in 1942. 

 

•    However, in 1942, the action was generally harsh, resulting in concrete entanglements between repression and conciliation at the end of the war, when Congressmen were released and provincial ministries were once again on the table. 

 

•    Officials' morale plummeted when Congressmen's demands for investigations and calls for vengeance were ignored on the grounds that some leeway had to be given during electioneering. Although the previous Viceroy, Linlithgow, had promised that no inquiries would be made, the services had little faith in the government's ability to withstand congressional pressure.

 

Wavell, the Viceroy at the time, admitted that the most difficult issue posed by the formation of provincial Ministries was inquiries. The portents were clear to those officials and policymakers who understood the dynamics of power and authority by the end of the war. The army's demand for leniency toward INA men, as well as a rebellion in a section of the RJN, signaled to the foresighted officials, just as a full-scale mutiny would to others more brashly confident, that the storm brewing this time might prove irrepressible. 

 

•    The structure was still intact, but it was feared that if Congress launched a mass movement similar to that of 1942 after the elections, which the provincial Ministries would aid rather than control, the services and armed forces would be unreliable. 

 

•    When it became clear that British rule could not last much longer, the overarching goal of British policymakers became a graceful withdrawal from India, to be carried out after a settlement had been reached on the modalities of power transfer and the nature of the post-imperial relationship between Britain and India.' 

 

•    The British government was clear that a settlement was required for good future relations as well as to put an end to the spectra of a mass movement. Because failure was not an option, the concessions had to largely satisfy Congress's demands. 

 

The Cabinet Mission went to India in March 1946 to negotiate the formation of a national government and to set in motion machinery for power transfer, in response to the Congress' demand that the British leave India. 

 

•    The Cabinet Mission, unlike the Cripps Mission in 1942, was prepared to stay for an extended period of time. The situation appeared to be ripe for a settlement, as imperialist rulers were aware of the need for one and nationalist leaders were willing to negotiate with them. 

 

•    However, rivers of blood would flow before Indian independence, which had been accepted tacitly in early 1946, became a reality in mid-1947. The imperialism-nationalism conflict had been resolved in principle by early 1946, and it had faded from view. The stage was then taken over by the British, the Congress, and the Muslim League's opposing visions of the post-imperial order. 

 

•    The Congress demanded that power be transferred to a single center, with minorities' demands being worked out in a framework that included everything from autonomy for Muslim provinces to secession from the Indian Union — but only after the British had left. The British vision was for a united India that was friendly to the United Kingdom and a willing participant in Commonwealth defense. 

 

•    A divided India, it was thought, would lack defense depth, thwart joint defense plans, and be a blot on Britain's diplomacy. As the Government's policy of fostering the League since its inception in 1906 and the current alignment between Pakistan and the Western imperialist bloc may suggest, Pakistan was not seen by Britain as a natural future ally.

 

•    In sharp contrast to earlier declarations, British policy in 1946 clearly reflected this preference for a united India. Wavell's allowing Jinnah to wreck the Simla Conference in June-July 1945 by insisting on nominating all Muslims was a far cry from Attlee's 15 March 1946 statement that a "minority will not be allowed to place a veto on the progress of the majority." 

 

•    The Cabinet Mission was convinced that Pakistan was unsustainable and that minorities' autonomy needed to be protected in the context of a united India. The Mission Plan called for three sections to meet separately to decide on group constitutions: A, which included Madras, Bombay, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, C.P., and Orissa; B, which included Punjab, NWFP, and Sind; and C, which included Bengal and Assam. 

 

•    A single command centre would be in charge of defence, foreign affairs, and communications. A province could emerge from a group after the first general elections. A province could request a review of the group or union constitution after ten years.

 

•    Congress wanted a province to be able to leave a group without having to wait until the first elections; instead, it should be able to choose not to join in the first place. When it asked this question, it was thinking of the Congress-ruled provinces of Assam and NWFP (which were in Sections C and B, respectively). 

 

•    The League wanted provinces to be able to challenge the union constitution right away, rather than waiting ten years. The fact that the Mission Plan was ambiguous about whether grouping was mandatory or optional was obviously a problem. It stated that while grouping was optional, sections were required. Rather than removing the inconsistency, the Mission purposefully argued about it in the hopes of reconciling the irreconcilable.

 

•    The Mission Plan was interpreted differently by the Congress and the League, but both saw it as a confirmation of their positions. As a result, Patel claimed that the Mission's Plan was hostile to Pakistan, that the League's veto had been lifted, and that only one Constituent Assembly would be convened. 

 

On June 6, the League announced its acceptance of the Plan insofar as the compulsory grouping implied the basis of Pakistan in the Mission's plan. In his speech to the AICC on July 7, 1946, Nehru stated the Congress working committee's interpretation of the plan: "We are not bound by a single thing except that we have decided to go into the Constituent Assembly." The implication was that the Assembly was sovereign and that the rules of procedure would be decided by it. On July 29, 1946, Jinnah took advantage of Nehru's speech to withdraw the League's acceptance of the Mission Plan.