Situation In India During Ww-ii

•    When Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, World War II began. In March 1938, Germany occupied Austria, and in 1939, it occupied Czechoslovakia. Following an appeasement policy toward Hitler, Britain and France were now forced to come to Poland's aid and declare war on Germany. On September 3, 1939, they did just that. 

 

•    Without consulting the Congress or the elected members of the central legislature, the Indian government declared war on Germany right away. As we saw earlier, the Congress sympathised fully with the victims of fascist aggression, and its immediate response was to come to the aid of anti-fascist forces.

 

•    Gandhiji's reaction was passionate. He told the Viceroy that the prospect of the House of Parliament and Westminster Abbey being destroyed caused him great distress, and that, while fully sympathising with the Allied cause, he was in favour of full and unquestioning cooperation with Britain. 

 

•    However, the majority of Congress leaders questioned how an enslaved nation could assist others in their fight for freedom. The official Congress position was adopted at a meeting of the Congress Working Committee held in Wardha from 10 to 14 September, to which Subhas Bose, Acharya Narendra Dev, and Jayaprakash Narayan were also invited, in keeping with the nationalist tradition of accommodating diversity of opinion. During this meeting, there were a lot of sharp disagreements.

 

•    Gandhiji advocated for a sympathetic attitude toward the Allies. He believed there was a clear distinction between Western Europe's democratic states and Hitler's totalitarian Nazi state. Because both sides were fighting for gaining or defending colonial territories, the Socialists and Subhas Bose argued that the war was imperialist. 

 

•    As a result, the question of whether to support one of the two sides did not arise. Instead, the Congress should seize the opportunity to wrest freedom by launching a civil disobedience movement right away.

 

Jawaharlal Nehru stance: Jawaharlal Nehru took a unique stance. He had been warning the world for years about the dangers of Nazi aggression, and he distinguished between democracy and fascism. 

 

•    He believed that justice was on Britain's, France's, and Poland's side. But he was also convinced that Britain and France were imperialist countries, and that the War was the result of capitalism's internal contradictions maturing since World War I ended. 

 

•    As a result, he argued that India should not join the war until she had gained independence, nor should she take advantage of Britain's difficulties by starting a war right away. 

 

•    Gandhiji discovered that even his closest supporters, such as Sardar Patel and Rajendra Prasad, did not agree with him. As a result, he decided to support Nehru's position, which the Working Committee later adopted. Gandhiji, who had been advocating more or less unconditional support for Britain, was the most enraged.

 

•    On October 23, the Working Committee rejected the Viceregal statement as a reiteration of old imperialist policy, decided not to support the War, and demanded that Congress ministries resign in protest. As disciplined soldiers of the national movement, they did so. 

 

•    However, the Congress leadership remained hesitant to issue a call for an immediate and massive anti-imperialist struggle. In fact, a resolution passed by the Working Committee on October 23 cautioned Congressmen against acting too quickly.

 

•    While Congressmen were in agreement on the war's attitude and the resigning of ministries, sharp disagreements arose over the timing of a mass satyagraha. 

 

Three broad reasons were advanced by Gandhiji and the dominant leadership for not launching an immediate movement. 

 

1.    They believed that because the Allies' cause — Britain and France — was just, they should not be embarrassed in the War's prosecution.

 

2.    There was a significant barrier to a struggle due to the lack of Hindu-Muslim unity. In the current climate, any act of civil disobedience could easily devolve into communal rioting or even civil war. 

 

3.    Above all, they believed that there was no atmosphere in the country conducive to an immediate struggle. Neither the masses nor the Congress were in a position to launch a struggle. 

 

•    During 1938-39, the Congress organisation was weak and corrupted. Within the ranks of the Congress, there was indiscipline and a lack of cohesion. In these circumstances, a mass movement would be unable to withstand the government's harsh repressive measures. 

 

•    As a result, it was necessary to continue intensive political work among the people, preparing them for struggle, to strengthen the Congress organisation and purge it of weaknesses, and to negotiate with authorities until all options for a negotiated settlement had been exhausted and the Government was clearly seen as being in the wrong by all. 

 

•    The time would come to start a struggle when the people were strong and ready to fight, the Congress organisation was well-established, and the government took such aggressive action that the people felt compelled to take mass action. 

 

•    The Working Committee's position was encapsulated in a resolution presented to the Congress's Ramgarh Session in March 1940. The resolution declared that the Congress would resort to civil disobedience.

 

•    A coalition of various left-wing groups, including Subhas Bose and his Forward Bloc, the Congress Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Royists, and others, offered an alternative to the dominant leadership's position. 

 

•    The War was characterised as an imperialist conflict by the Left, who claimed that the crisis provided an opportunity to achieve freedom through an all-out fight against British imperialism. It was convinced that the people were ready to act and were just waiting for a call from the top. 

 

•    They recognised that obstacles such as the communal problem and weaknesses in the Congress organisation existed, but they believed that once a mass struggle began, these would be easily and automatically overcome. 

 

•    They claimed that organisational strength should be developed during a struggle rather than before it. 

 

•    The Left slammed the Congress leadership's "wait and see" policy, accusing it of being afraid of the masses, losing enthusiasm for struggle, and, as a result, attempting to bargain and compromise with imperialism in order to secure petty concessions. 

 

•    They urged Congress leaders to take immediate action to launch a mass movement. While agreeing on the need for immediate struggle, the Left was split on how to understand political forces and how to proceed with political action if the Congress's dominant leadership refused to accept the line of immediate struggle.

 

•    Subhas Bose wished for the Left to split the Congress if it did not begin a struggle, to form a parallel Congress, and to begin its own struggle. He was convinced that the people and the vast majority of Congress members would rally behind the Left-led parallel Congress and join the movement it would launch. 

 

This was not the case for the CSP and CPI. They believed that Bose was grossly exaggerating the Left's influence, and that no struggle could be launched without Gandhiji's and the Congress's leadership. As a result, rather than splitting the Congress and thus disrupting the national united fronts, an attempt should be made to persuade and pressurise its leadership to begin a struggle.