The Crisis At Tripuri And Subhas Chandra Bose

The election victory of the Congress in 1937 and the subsequent formation of popular ministries shifted the power balance within the country in relation to the colonial authorities. The rise of left-wing parties and ideas fuelled a rise in militancy among nationalists. Another resurgence of the nationalist movement appeared to be on the horizon. 

 

•    In 1938, Subhas Bose was unanimously elected President of the Congress. He decided to run for office again in 1939, this time as a spokesperson for militant politics and radical groups. 

 

•    On 21 January 1939, Bose announced his candidacy, claiming that he represented the "new ideas, ideologies, problems, and programmes" that had emerged with "the progressive sharpening of the anti-imperialist struggle in India."

 

•    He believes that presidential elections should be fought between different candidates "on the basis of specific problems and programmes." 

 

•    On January 24, Sardar Patel, Rajendra Prasad, J.B. Kripalani, and four other members of the Congress Working Committee issued a counter statement, claiming that discussions of ideologies, programmes, and policies were irrelevant in the election of a Congress president because they were developed by various Congress bodies such as the AICC and the Working Committee, and that the Cong's position was irrelevant.

 

•    With Gandhiji's blessing, Pattabhi Sitaramayya nominated for the election. On the 29th of January, Subhas Bose was elected by a margin of 1580 votes over 1377. Sitaramayya's defeat, Gandhiji declared, was "more mine than his." But Bose's election accomplished nothing; it only brought the brewing crisis to a head at the Congress's Tripuri session.

 

•    One example was Bose's propaganda against Sardar Patel and the majority of the top Congress leadership, whom he labelled as rightists. He openly accused them of working for a federation compromise with the government, even compiling a list of potential central' ministers, and thus of not wanting a leftist as the Congress's president "who may be a thorn in the side of a compromise and may put obstacles in the way of negotiations." As a result, he urged Congressmen to vote for a leftist who was also a "true anti-federalist."

 

•    Subhas's thinking of the time is even more crudely expressed in this autobiography: ‘As Congress President, the writer did his best to stiffen the opposition of the Congress Party to any compromise with Britain and this caused annoyance in Gandhian circles who were then looking forward to an understanding with the British Government.’ He wrote that the Gandhiists "did not want to be disturbed in their ministerial and parliamentary work" and that they were at the time opposed to any national struggle.

 

•    The Congress leaders, who had been labelled as compromisers, resented the accusations and called them slander. ‘Subhas Babu has mentioned his opposition to the federation,' they said in a statement. All members of the Working Committee agree on this. It is a policy of the Congress.' They felt they couldn't work with a president who publicly questioned their nationalist credentials after Subhas' election.

 

•    Earlier, Gandhiji had issued a statement on 31st January saying: ‘I rejoice in this defeat’ because ‘Subhas Babu, instead of being President on the sufferance of those whom he calls rightists, is now President elected in a contested election. This enables him to choose a homogeneous cabinet and enforce his programme without let or hindrance.’

 

Along with the other twelve members of the Working Committee, Jawaharlal Nehru did not resign. He was apprehensive about confronting Bose in public. He did not, however, agree with Bose. He had stated before the elections that no principles or programmes were at stake in the election. 

 

Bose's criticisms of his colleagues had irritated him. He also didn't believe the conflict was between the Left and the Right. ‘I don't know who you consider a leftist and who you consider a rightist,' he wrote to Subhas on February 4, 1939:

 

•    The underlying Bose-Gandhian debate, however, was characterised by fundamental policy and tactical differences. They were based in part on differing perceptions of political reality, as well as differing assessments of the Congress's strength and weakness, as well as the masses' readiness for struggle. 

 

•    Subhas Bose believed that the Congress was strong enough to organise an immediate struggle and that the people were willing to participate. He was convinced, as he later wrote, that the country was more internally ripe for a revolution than it had ever been, and that the coming international crisis would provide India with an opportunity for achieving her emancipation, which was unprecedented in human history. 

 

•    In his presidential address at Tripuri, he advocated for a programme of immediately giving the British government a six-month deadline to grant the national demand for independence, and launching a mass civil disobedience movement if it did not.' 

 

•    Gandhiji had a very different perspective. He, too, believed that a new round of mass struggle was required to achieve independence, because Indians were in a "impossible situation." ‘The darkness that seems to have enveloped me will disappear, and that, whether with another battle more brilliant than the Dandi March or without, India will come to her own,' he wrote in mid-July 1938. 

 

•    However, he believed that the time was not yet right for an ultimatum because neither the Congress nor the people were prepared to fight. First and foremost, Indians must "put our own house in order."

 

•    Gandhiji's opinions were based primarily on his evaluation of the Congress organisation. He believed that corruption and indiscipline had harmed the country's ability to fight. He repeatedly and publicly raised the issues of mutual rivalries and bickering among Congressmen, bogus membership and impersonation at party elections, attempts to capture Congress Committees, and the general decline of authority in the Congress during 1938 and early 1939.

 

•    Internal strife peaked during the Congress's Tripuri session, which took place from March 8 to 12, 1939. Bose had completely miscalculated his popularity and the significance of his presidential majority. Congressmen had voted for him for a variety of reasons, the most important of which was that he stood for militant politics, not because they wanted him to be the national movement's supreme leader. 

 

•    They were unwilling to reject Gandhiji's or other older leaders' leadership in bringing this home to Subhas.

 

•    At Tripuri, Govind Ballabh Pant moved a resolution expressing lack of confidence in the old Working Committee, reiterating full faith in Gandhiji's leadership of the movement and the Congress policies of the previous twenty years, and requesting that Subhas nominate his Working Committee "in accordance with Gandhiji's wishes." Although the resolution was passed by a large majority, Gandhiji disapproved of it and refused to impose a Working Committee on Subhas. He requested that he nominate a Committee of his choosing. 

 

•    Subhas Bose, on the other hand, refused to accept the challenge. He'd put himself in an untenable situation. He recognised that he could not lead the organisation alone, but he was also unwilling to accept the majority's leadership. He wanted Gandhiji to be the leader of the upcoming struggle in order to best construct his policy, but he also wanted Gandhiji to follow the strategy and tactics laid out by him and the left-wing parties and groups. 

 

•    Gandhiji, on the other hand, would either lead the Congress using his own strategy and political style or relinquish his leadership position. As he wrote to Bose: ‘if your prognosis is right, I am a back number and played out as the generalissimo of Satyagraha.” In other words, as Rajendra Prasad later wrote in his Autobiography, Gandhiji and the older leaders would not accept a situation in which the strategy and tactics were not theirs but the responsibility for putting them into action fell to them.

 

•    Nehru attempted to mediate between the two parties, persuading Bose not to resign while also urging Gandhiji and the older leaders to be more accommodating.

 

•    Bose, on the other hand, refused to resign. On the one hand, he insisted that the Working Committee reflect the new radical trends and groups that had elected him; on the other hand, he refused to nominate his own Working Committee. 

 

•    He preferred to resign as soon as possible. As a result, Rajendra Prasad was elected in his place. The United States Congress had weathered yet another storm. 

 

•    At Tripuri and after, Bose was unable to gain the support of the Congress Socialists and Communists, who were unwilling to divide the national movement and believed that its unity must be preserved at all costs. 

 

•    After Tripuri, the CPI stated that the interests of the anti-imperialist struggle demanded a united leadership under the guidance of Gandhiji, rather than the exclusive leadership of one wing. 

 

Subhas Bose and his supporters then formed the Forward Bloc, a new political party within the Congress, in May. When he called for an all-India protest against an AICC resolution on July 9, the Working Committee took disciplinary action against him, removing him from his position as president of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee and barring him from holding any Congress office for three years. 

 

•    When Nazi Germany invaded Poland on September 1, 1939, World War II began. In March 1938, Germany occupied Austria, and in 1939, it occupied Czechoslovakia. Following an appeasement policy toward Hitler, Britain and France were now forced to come to Poland's aid and declare war on Germany. On September 3, 1939, they did just that. 

 

•    Without consulting the Congress or the elected members of the central legislature, the Indian government declared war on Germany right away. As we saw earlier, the Congress sympathised fully with the victims of fascist aggression, and its immediate response was to come to the aid of anti-fascist forces.

 

•    Gandhiji's reaction was passionate. He told the Viceroy that the prospect of the House of Parliament and Westminster Abbey being destroyed caused him great distress, and that, while fully sympathising with the Allied cause, he was in favour of full and unquestioning cooperation with Britain. 

 

•    However, the majority of Congress leaders questioned how an enslaved nation could assist others in their fight for freedom. The official Congress position was adopted at a meeting of the Congress Working Committee held in Wardha from 10 to 14 September, to which Subhas Bose, Acharya Narendra Dev, and Jayaprakash Narayan were also invited, in keeping with the nationalist tradition of accommodating diversity of opinion. During this meeting, there were a lot of sharp disagreements.

 

•    Gandhiji advocated for a sympathetic attitude toward the Allies. He believed there was a clear distinction between Western Europe's democratic states and Hitler's totalitarian Nazi state. Because both sides were fighting for gaining or defending colonial territories, the Socialists and Subhas Bose argued that the war was imperialist. 

 

•    As a result, the question of whether to support one of the two sides did not arise. Instead, the Congress should seize the opportunity to wrest freedom by launching a civil disobedience movement right away.

 

Jawaharlal Nehru stance: Jawaharlal Nehru took a unique stance. He had been warning the world for years about the dangers of Nazi aggression, and he distinguished between democracy and fascism. 

 

•    He believed that justice was on Britain's, France's, and Poland's side. But he was also convinced that Britain and France were imperialist countries, and that the War was the result of capitalism's internal contradictions maturing since World War I ended. 

 

•    As a result, he argued that India should not join the war until she had gained independence, nor should she take advantage of Britain's difficulties by starting a war right away. 

 

•    Gandhiji discovered that even his closest supporters, such as Sardar Patel and Rajendra Prasad, did not agree with him. As a result, he decided to support Nehru's position, which the Working Committee later adopted. Gandhiji, who had been advocating more or less unconditional support for Britain, was the most enraged.

 

•    On October 23, the Working Committee rejected the Viceregal statement as a reiteration of old imperialist policy, decided not to support the War, and demanded that Congress ministries resign in protest. As disciplined soldiers of the national movement, they did so. 

 

•    However, the Congress leadership remained hesitant to issue a call for an immediate and massive anti-imperialist struggle. In fact, a resolution passed by the Working Committee on October 23 cautioned Congressmen against acting too quickly.

 

•    While Congressmen were in agreement on the war's attitude and the resigning of ministries, sharp disagreements arose over the timing of a mass satyagraha. 

 

Three broad reasons were advanced by Gandhiji and the dominant leadership for not launching an immediate movement. 

 

1.    They believed that because the Allies' cause — Britain and France — was just, they should not be embarrassed in the War's prosecution.

 

2.    There was a significant barrier to a struggle due to the lack of Hindu-Muslim unity. In the current climate, any act of civil disobedience could easily devolve into communal rioting or even civil war. 

 

3.    Above all, they believed that there was no atmosphere in the country conducive to an immediate struggle. Neither the masses nor the Congress were in a position to launch a struggle. 

 

•    During 1938-39, the Congress organisation was weak and corrupted. Within the ranks of the Congress, there was indiscipline and a lack of cohesion. In these circumstances, a mass movement would be unable to withstand the government's harsh repressive measures. 

 

•    As a result, it was necessary to continue intensive political work among the people, preparing them for struggle, to strengthen the Congress organisation and purge it of weaknesses, and to negotiate with authorities until all options for a negotiated settlement had been exhausted and the Government was clearly seen as being in the wrong by all. 

 

•    The time would come to start a struggle when the people were strong and ready to fight, the Congress organisation was well-established, and the government took such aggressive action that the people felt compelled to take mass action. 

 

•    The Working Committee's position was encapsulated in a resolution presented to the Congress's Ramgarh Session in March 1940. The resolution declared that the Congress would resort to civil disobedience.

 

•    A coalition of various left-wing groups, including Subhas Bose and his Forward Bloc, the Congress Socialist Party, the Communist Party, the Royists, and others, offered an alternative to the dominant leadership's position. 

 

•    The War was characterised as an imperialist conflict by the Left, who claimed that the crisis provided an opportunity to achieve freedom through an all-out fight against British imperialism. It was convinced that the people were ready to act and were just waiting for a call from the top. 

 

•    They recognised that obstacles such as the communal problem and weaknesses in the Congress organisation existed, but they believed that once a mass struggle began, these would be easily and automatically overcome. 

 

•    They claimed that organisational strength should be developed during a struggle rather than before it. 

 

•    The Left slammed the Congress leadership's "wait and see" policy, accusing it of being afraid of the masses, losing enthusiasm for struggle, and, as a result, attempting to bargain and compromise with imperialism in order to secure petty concessions. 

 

•    They urged Congress leaders to take immediate action to launch a mass movement. While agreeing on the need for immediate struggle, the Left was split on how to understand political forces and how to proceed with political action if the Congress's dominant leadership refused to accept the line of immediate struggle.

 

•    Subhas Bose wished for the Left to split the Congress if it did not begin a struggle, to form a parallel Congress, and to begin its own struggle. He was convinced that the people and the vast majority of Congress members would rally behind the Left-led parallel Congress and join the movement it would launch. 

 

This was not the case for the CSP and CPI. They believed that Bose was grossly exaggerating the Left's influence, and that no struggle could be launched without Gandhiji's and the Congress's leadership. As a result, rather than splitting the Congress and thus disrupting the national united fronts, an attempt should be made to persuade and pressurise its leadership to begin a struggle. 

 

Background: Congress leadership and public were losing patience. The government refused to budge, claiming that no constitutional progress could be made until the Congress reached an agreement with Muslim communalists.

 

•    It kept passing ordinances restricting freedom of expression and the press, as well as the right to form associations. 

 

•    Throughout the country, nationalist workers, particularly those on the left, were harassed, arrested, and imprisoned. 

 

•    The government was preparing to crush the Congress if it attempted to organise a mass movement. In this situation, the Indians believed it was time to demonstrate to the British that their patience was not a sign of weakness. 

 

•    The Congress asked Gandhiji to take command once more near the end of 1940. Within his broad strategic perspective, Gandhiji began to take steps that would lead to a mass struggle. In each locality, he decided to start a limited Satyagraha by a few selected individuals on an individual basis. 

 

A Satyagrahi's demand would be for the freedom of speech to preach against war participation. ‘It is wrong to help the British war effort with men or money,' the Satyagrahi would publicly declare. The only worthwhile effort is nonviolent resistance to all wars.' 

 

Vinoba Bhave was the first Satyagrahi on 17 October 1940, and Jawaharlal Nehru was the second — they were surrounded by huge crowds, and the authorities could often only arrest them after they had given their speeches. If a Satyagrahi was not arrested by the government, he or she would not only repeat the performance, but also move into the villages and begin a trek towards Delhi, thus becoming a part of the ‘Delhi Chalo' movement.

 

a.    Itexpressed the Indian people's strong political feelings while also allowing the British government to peacefully accept Indian demands. Because of their anti-Nazi feelings, Gandhiji and the Congress were hesitant to take advantage of Britain's predicament and embarrass her war effort by a mass uprising in India. Gandhiji was also starting to prepare the people for the upcoming struggle. The Congress organisation was being restructured; 

 

b.    Opportunist elements were being identified and expelled from the organisation. most importantly, people were being politically aroused, educated, and mobilised. More than 25,000 Satyagrahis had been convicted of individual civil disobedience by May 15, 1941. The government had let many more — lower-level political workers — go free

 

•    During 1941, there were two major changes in British politics. Poland, Belgium, Holland, Norway, and France, as well as the majority of Eastern Europe, had already been occupied by Nazi Germany. 

 

•    On June 22, 1941, it launched an attack on the Soviet Union. 

 

•    On the 7th of December, Japan launched a surprise attack on the American fleet at Pearl Harbor. It swept through the Philippines, Indo-China, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Burma in a matter of days. 

 

•    In March 1942, it took over Rangoon. The war had come to India's doorstep. The King was warned by Winston Churchill, now the British Prime Minister that Burma, Ceylon, Calcutta, and Madras could fall into enemy hands. 

 

•    The Indian leaders, who were released from prison in early December, were concerned about the country's security and defence. They were also very concerned about the Soviet Union and China. Many people believed that Hitler's attack on the Soviet Union had changed the war's tone. 

 

•    Gandhiji had previously condemned the Japanese slogan "Asia for Asiatics" and urged Indians to boycott Japanese goods. 

 

The Congress Working Committee, eager to defend Indian territory and assist the Allies, overrode Gandhiji and Nehru's objections and passed a resolution at the end of December offering to fully cooperate in the defence of India and the Allies if Britain agreed to give full independence after the war and the substance of power immediately. Gandhiji named Jawaharlal Nehru as his chosen successor at this time.