The Imposition Of Internal Emergency: An Attack On The Constitution
Background of emergency:
The JP Movement sparked hopes that the question of who truly represented the Indian people could be resolved through democratic elections. This, however, was not to be. On June 12, 1975, Justice Sinha of the Allahabad High Court handed down a landmark decision on an election petition filed by Raj Narain, convicting Mrs. Gandhi of corrupt campaign practices and declaring her election null and void. As a result of her conviction, she was unable to run for parliament or hold office for more than six years, preventing her from continuing as Prime Minister.
• Most observers at the time noted that Justice Sinha had dismissed the more serious charges against her but found her guilty of minor, even frivolous, violations of the election law. Mrs. Gandhi refused to resign and went to the Supreme Court to seek a restraining order.
• While the Supreme Court would hear her appeal on July 14, the Supreme Court's vacation judge, Justice V.R. Krishna Iyer, added to the confusion when he decided on June 24 that Mrs. Gandhi could stay in office and speak in parliament but not vote until her appeal was finally decided by the full bench of the Supreme Court.
• Meanwhile, on June 13, Mrs. Gandhi received yet another political setback when the Gujarat assembly election results were announced. In a house of 182, the opposition Janata Front won 87 seats and the Congress 75. Surprisingly, the Janata Front was able to form a government in alliance with the same Chimanbhai Patel who had sparked the popular movement against corruption and mismanagement.
• The verdict in Allahabad and the results of the Gujarat assembly elections reignited the opposition movement. The JP and the opposition coalition, on the other hand, were not willing to wait for the outcome of Indira Gandhi's Supreme Court appeal or the general elections to the Lok Sabha, which are due in eight months. They decided to take advantage of the situation, accusing Mrs. Gandhi of "clinging to an office obtained corruptly," demanding her resignation and calling for a nationwide campaign to force the issue.
• On the 25th of June, they announced that on the 29th of June, a nation-wide one-week campaign of mass mobilization and civil disobedience to force Mrs. Gandhi to resign would begin. Hundreds of thousands of volunteers would gherao the prime minister's house at the end of the campaign.
• JP asked the people to make it impossible for the government to function in his rally speech, and he again urged the armed forces, police, and bureaucracy to refuse to obey any orders they deemed to be "illegal" and "unconstitutional." Mrs. Gandhi responded quickly by declaring a state of internal emergency on June 26.
Declaration of emergency:
• Former President Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed declared a national emergency in India on June 26, 1975, which lasted 21 months. As a result, elections were halted and civil liberties were restricted. The press was censored, and most of Gandhi's political opponents were imprisoned.
• A variety of human rights were also violated during the Emergency. Sanjay Gandhi led a shambolic forced mass-sterilization campaign during this time. As a result, the emergency period is regarded as one of the most contentious periods in India's independent history.
• The Emergency Period- As soon as the President of India declared a national emergency, all powers were concentrated in the hands of the Union government. During this time, the government assumed mammoth power and restricted citizens' fundamental rights. Under duress, the press was kept quiet. For the articles to be published, all newspapers needed to get prior approval. The Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) and Jamait-e-Islami were also banned by the Union government.
• Furthermore, the Constitution was amended in an autocratic manner, particularly in the 42nd amendment, due to the government's large majority in parliament. An amendment was made in the aftermath of the Allahabad High Court decision, declaring that elections for Prime Minister, President, and Vice-President could not be challenged in court. Apart from that, Sanjay Gandhi, who had no official position at the time, was able to take control of the administration.
• The government finally decided to hold an election in March 1977 in January 1977. The opposition came together to form the Janata Party, led by JP Narayan, and the Congress was defeated in the Lok Sabha elections for the first time since independence. Only 154 seats were won by the Congress in the Lok Sabha, while 295 seats were won by the Janata Party (330, along with its allies). Indira Gandhi and her son Sanjay Gandhi were defeated in Rae Bareli and Amethi, respectively.
PUBLIC RESPONSE TO THE EMERGENCY
• In the first few days, less than 10,000 people were arrested throughout the country. However, many of the detainees were released in a short period of time. Above all, the positive outcome of some of the well-publicized Emergency measures, most of which could, of course, have been taken without an Emergency, impressed a large number of people.
• Many people felt relieved that the country had been saved from chaos and disorder with the restoration of public order and discipline. There was less crime in the cities; gheraos and uncontrolled, often violent, demonstrations ceased; there was a noticeable decrease in tension in the air; and there was calm and tranquilly on campus as students and teachers returned to their classrooms.
• ‘The return of normal and orderly life, after relentless disruption by strikes, protest marches, sit-ins, and clashes with the police, was applauded by most people,' wrote Inder Malhotra, a perceptive journalist later. The Emergency, at least in its early months, brought India back to a state of calm it hadn't experienced in years.
• There was also an immediate and widespread improvement in administration, with government employees arriving on time and treating the public with more respect. Smugglers, hoarders, black marketers, illegal foreign currency traders, and tax evaders were targeted quickly, dramatically, and widely publicized, with thousands of them being arrested under the MISA.
• The economy improved dramatically, though only some of it was due to steps taken during the Emergency; some of it was due to exceptional rains and some of it was due to policies implemented long before the Emergency. The dramatic improvement in the price situation was especially welcome. The cost of essential goods, such as food, has decreased, and their availability in stores has improved.
Twenty point program
• The announcement on 1 July of Mrs. Gandhi's omnibus Twenty-Point Programed, with its edge being the socio-economic uplift of the vast majority of the rural poor, raised popular hopes and made the Emergency more palatable.
• The Program promised to liquidate the existing debts of landless laborers, small farmers, and rural artisans and extend alternate credit to them, abolish bonded labor, implement existing agricultural land ceiling laws and distribute surplus land to the landless, provide house sites to landless laborers and weaker sections, revise upwards minimum agricultural labor wages, and provide special assistance to landless laborers and weaker sections.
• The Twenty-Point Programme was implemented with serious effort, and some quick results were achieved in terms of price reductions, free availability of essential commodities, and a check on hoarding, smuggling, and tax evasion. The agenda for the uplift of the rural poor was, however, at the heart of the Twenty-Point Programme. Even there, some progress was made.
• The landless and Dalits were given three million house sites. Approximately 1.1 million acres of surplus land were distributed to the landless; however, this represented less than 10% of the total surplus land. Although bonded labour was made illegal, the practise continued unabated. Different states passed laws prohibiting the collection of debts owed by landless labourers and small farmers, and in some cases, allowing them to scale back or liquidate their debts.
• However, the alternative credit provided by nationalised banks and rural cooperative institutions was limited, and reliance on usurious moneylenders, who were frequently also large landowners, remained. The minimum wage for agricultural labourers was increased, but enforcement was once again delayed.
• The rural segment of the Twenty-Point Programme, on the other hand, ran out of steam as large landowners and wealthy peasants, as well as an uncaring bureaucracy, stymied its progress. As a result, while the programme provided some relief to the rural poor, their basic conditions did not improve.
Situation during emergency:
• The fact that the Emergency was constitutional, legal, and temporary was a major factor in people's acceptance of it. Article 352 of the Constitution was used to declare it. Parliament approved it, and the courts backed it up. To the people, it was a stopgap measure, a temporary suspension of democracy's normal rules and institutions. They saw it as neither a replacement for democracy nor an attempt to impose a dictatorship.
• Mrs. Gandhi maintained throughout the Emergency that she was fully committed to multi-party democracy and a free press, that the Emergency was an abnormal remedy for an abnormal situation, and that democratic conditions and elections would be restored as soon as the situation returned to normal. Mrs. Gandhi's words were often taken literally by the Indian people.
• Towards the End of the Emergency-Within a few months, however, people began to lose faith in the Emergency. Popular discontent peaked in mid-1976 and peaked again six months later. There are a variety of reasons for this. The people's relief did not last long.
• The first year of the Emergency's economic growth was short-lived. By the end of 1976, agricultural output had decreased by 10%, and prices had risen by 10%. As the shock of the Emergency wore off, the corrupt, black-marketers, and smugglers resumed their activities.
• The poor were dissatisfied with the slow progress in their welfare, and workers were dissatisfied with wage, bonus, and dearness allowance limits, as well as restrictions on the right to strike. Government employees and teachers were dissatisfied because they were subjected to workplace discipline and, in many cases, were forced to meet sterilisation quotas.y
Real situation during emergency:
• In reality, no real progress could be made along the declared lines because Mrs. Gandhi and the Congress failed to establish any new social change agencies or organs for popular mobilization.
• The same old corrupt and inefficient bureaucracy and manipulative and discredited politicians were solely responsible for the implementation of the Twenty-Point Program and other developmental programs In terms of the general public, things deteriorated because there were no avenues for protest or any other mechanism for voicing and redressing their grievances. Even ordinary people, not just intellectuals and political workers, lived in a fearful and insecure environment.
• The bureaucracy and the police now have more power, which has been unchecked by the press, courts, MLAs and MPs, political parties, and popular movements.
• The two decided to take advantage of their power in the usual ways. This impacted everyone, but the poor were the hardest hit. This was especially evident in northern India.
• Simultaneously, the government was kept completely unaware of what was going on in the country due to severe press censorship and the silencing of protests.
• People also lost faith in the press and radio because they knew what was published in them was heavily censored. They began to rely more heavily on rumors, and they tended to assume the worst when it came to the government's actions or intentions.
• The denial of civil liberties began to affect the everyday lives of ordinary people in the form of harassment and corruption by petty officials. The fear that the authoritarian structure of the rule would be made permanent or continue for a long time grew as the Emergency was delayed, especially since Mrs. Gandhi had gotten parliament to postpone elections by a year in November 1976.
• The intelligentsia—teachers, journalists, professionals, and small-town lawyers—and the middle classes in particular saw the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, which was ratified in September 1976, as an attempt to undermine democracy by altering the Constitution's fundamental structure. The Emergency, which had previously been considered acceptable, began to lose its legitimacy.
Sanjay Gandhi
• However, the development of an extra-constitutional center of power associated with the rise to political power of Mrs. Gandhi's younger son, Sanjay Gandhi, who held no office in the government or Congress, was a major reason for the Emergency regime's growing unpopularity.
• Sanjay Gandhi had emerged as a parallel authority by April 1976, interfering with the government and administration at will. Cabinet ministers, Congress leaders, chief ministers, and senior civil servants all courted and obeyed him. Within Congress, he rose to become the leader of the Youth Congress, which quickly overtook the parent party in terms of political clout.
• Sanjay presented his four points in July 1976, which gradually surpassed the official twenty points in importance. The four points were:
1. don't take a dowry when you marry;
2. practise family planning and limit families to two children;
3. plant trees;
4. Promote literacy.
• Sanjay Gandhi was also committed to beautifying cities by removing slums and illegal structures that obstruct roads, bazaars, parks, monuments, and other public spaces.
• Sanjay Gandhi pushed the government to promote family planning more aggressively, even if it meant acting in an arbitrary, illegitimate, and authoritarian manner. Compulsion and coercion, particularly compulsory sterilization, have increasingly replaced incentives and persuasion.
• Government employees, school teachers, and health care workers were given arbitrary quotas of people to ‘motivate' to undergo sterilization. The police and the administration stepped up their efforts to enforce the quotas. The poor in rural and urban areas were the hardest hit, and they protested in a variety of ways, including fleeing, hiding, and rioting. Furthermore, due to press censorship, stories of forcible vasectomies and violent resistance by the people spread quickly and widely, both true and false.
• Slum clearance and unauthorized structure demolition followed the same pattern as the family planning programed, but with even more callousness and cruelty, affecting primarily Delhi and a few other cities. Thus, the excesses committed under Sanjay Gandhi's direction exacerbated the already existing climate of fear and repression, corruption, and abuse of power.
THE END OF THE EMERGENCY AND 1977 ELECTIONS
• Mrs. Gandhi announced on January 18, 1977, that Lok Sabha elections would be held in March. She also released political prisoners, lifted press censorship, and lifted other restrictions on political activity, such as the holding of public meetings, all at the same time. Political parties were given complete freedom to campaign. The elections were held on March 16th in a free and fair environment, and the results showed that Congress had been soundly defeated. Both Mrs. Gandhi and Sanjay Gandhi were seated in the front row.
• Mrs. Gandhi issued a statement in which she accepted the people's verdict with "due humility." Why did Mrs. Gandhi call for open and free elections and then hold them? After all, only two months before, in November 1976, she had persuaded parliament to postpone elections for a year. Although there has been a lot of speculation, there has yet to be a satisfactory answer to the question.
There are three broad explanations offered:
1. To begin, supporters argue that Mrs. Gandhi's decision reflected her deep commitment to liberal democracy and democratic values. ‘Throughout her life, her self-image had been that of a democrat; indeed, her self-respect derives in large part from this self-image,' according to Mary C. Carras, her biographer. She felt compelled to show the world, and especially herself, that she is and has always been a democrat.' According to some other writers, once Mrs. Gandhi became aware of the Emergency's excesses and realized that things were spiraling out of control, she decided to break free by holding elections, even if it meant losing power.
2. The unfavourable view is that Mrs. Gandhi completely misread popular sentiment and was convinced that she would win because she was misinformed by sycophants and intelligence agencies. She was unaware of the extent to which her rule had become unpopular because she was cut off from public opinion. She hoped to vindicate the Emergency by winning the election and pave the way for Sanjay Gandhi to succeed her.
3. The third point of view is that she realised that the Emergency's policies needed to be further legitimised through elections. The imposition of the Emergency had been justified from the start by a constitutional provision, but this was insufficient in light of Indian people's deep-seated traditions.
• Furthermore, there were obvious signs of restlessness and even dissatisfaction among the populace. She must have realised that the Emergency regime was losing favour and was becoming increasingly vulnerable. Either the Emergency's authoritarian content would have to be deepened, with increased ruthlessness and brutality in suppressing dissent, or greater legitimacy and political authority would have to be gained by returning to a democratic system.
• The first option would be unworkable in a country the size and diversity of India, as well as in light of its democratic traditions. The level of repression that would be required would be unacceptable to the people.
• Many Indians and India's friends abroad had doubts about the democratic system's future in India during 1975-77, though they hoped it would survive the political crisis. The less sympathetic claimed that India's democracy had been "permanently eclipsed" and that the country had finally joined the ranks of other post-colonial authoritarian states.
• Many others claimed that even if the Emergency was lifted and the parliamentary system was restored, the fundamental changes brought about by the Emergency and the essential characteristics of the new type of regime would remain. Some commentators went even further, claiming that the shift toward authoritarianism had been underway since 1950 and was rooted in a poor and illiterate society.
• Others claimed that India's democratic constitutional system, which was established in 1950, was unsuited to the country's genius or the needs of its people. Others believed that economic development and democracy could not be combined. Many radicals claimed that liberal democracy was merely a mask for the underlying brutal reality of class dominance and suppression of people's struggles. As a result, the Emergency had only removed the facade; it had not resulted in any fundamental political change other than the fact that the social and political reality was now visible to all.
• Many people in India and abroad believed that the Emergency was only a temporary break from the Indian people and political leadership's basic commitment to democracy, and that democracy would be restored in the country sooner or later. India's democratic system not only survived but grew stronger as a result of the JP Movement and the Emergency.
• Since 1977, there has been little discussion of the need for a dictatorship to develop economically and eliminate corruption. For several years, no intellectual or political leader of any stature has espoused this viewpoint, which has been reduced to a tiny minority among the middle classes.
• In this regard, the end of the Emergency and the subsequent free elections were watershed moments in India's post-independence history. They revealed the Indian people's deep commitment to democratic values, which was shaped by the impact of the independence struggle and the country's experience with democratic governance, including free elections, since 1947. '
• Whatever one thinks of the JP Movement or the Emergency regime, there is no doubt that Mrs. Gandhi's decision to hold truly free elections, as well as her defeat and the Opposition's victory, was a remarkable achievement of Indian democracy. The years 1975-77 have been dubbed the "test of democracy," and there is no doubt that the Indian people passed with flying colours, if not full marks.
THE JANTA INTERREGNUM AND INDIRA GANDHI’S SECOND HOME COMING
• The opposition leaders announced the merger of the Congress (O), Jan Sangh, Bharatiya Lok Dal (BLD), and Socialist Party into the new Janata Party shortly after their release from prison in January 1977. The Congress was dealt a blow when Jagjivan Ram, H.N. Bahuguna, and Nandini Satpathy abruptly left it on February 2, 1977, to form the Congress for Democracy (CFD). It formed a common front with the Janata Party, along with the DMK, Akali Dal, and CPM, in order to take on Congress and its allies, the CPI and AIADMK, in the Lok Sabha elections in March.
• The Emergency and its excesses, particularly forced sterilisations and restrictions on civil liberties, were major campaign issues for the opposition front. The elections were also viewed as a referendum on the Emergency. The Janata Party and its allies won 330 out of 542 seats, thanks to a popular upsurge in their favour. With only 154 seats, Congress trailed far behind, with the CPI gaining seven seats and the AIADMK gaining twenty-one.
• In North India, the Congress party was virtually wiped out, winning only 2 out of 234 seats in seven northern states. Indira Gandhi and Sanjay Gandhi were both defeated. Western India, on the other hand, had a mixed electoral result.
• Surprisingly, in the South, where the Emergency had been less severe and the Twenty-Point Programmer’s pro-poor measures had been better implemented, Congress improved its performance, winning 92 seats in 1971 instead of 70. In the four southern states, Janata won only six seats. Following the elections, the Congress for Democracy merged with the Janata Party.
• The three aspirants for Prime Minister, Morarji Desai, Charan Singh, and Jagjivan Ram, were in a near-crisis over the issue. The matter was referred to senior leaders Jayaprakash Narayan and J.B. Kripalani, who ruled in Desai's favour after he was sworn in as Prime Minister on March 23.
New government work:
• One of the new government's first moves was to try to strengthen its grip on the states. The government dismissed nine Congress-ruled state governments and ordered new elections to their state assemblies, arguing that in states where Congress had lost national elections, it had also lost the mandate to rule at the state level. Except for Tamil Nadu, where the AIADMK won the assembly elections in June 1977, Janata and its allies won in these states.
• The CPM, a Janata ally, won an absolute majority in West Bengal. In July 1977, the Janata Party used its control of both the parliament and the state legislatures to elect its own candidate, N. Sanjeeva Reddy, as President of the Union without opposition.
• The Janata government moved quickly to dismantle the Emergency regime's authoritarian elements and restore liberal democracy. It gave the Press, political parties, and individuals full civil liberties and fundamental rights. It also modified the 42nd Amendment, which had been passed during the Emergency, by repealing those of its provisions that had distorted the Constitution. The Supreme Court and High Courts were also given the power to decide on the constitutionality of federal and state legislation.
The Janata Party is in trouble
The Janata regime's political support began to dwindle, and disillusionment with it grew as a result of its failures in administration, implementing developmental policies, and achieving social justice. By the end of 1977, the regime's political momentum had faded, and the shaky Janata Party coalition began to disintegrate, though the government remained in power until July 1979.
For a variety of reasons, the lack of confidence in its ability to govern had begun to turn into anger by that time.
1. First, the Janata Party was unable to address rapidly rising social tensions in rural areas, one manifestation of which was the growing number of atrocities against the rural poor and Scheduled Castes.
2. In North India, the Janata Party's social base was primarily made up of rich and middle peasants from mostly intermediate castes, large landowners from upper castes, urban and rural shopkeepers, small businessmen, and the petty bourgeoisie. The rural landowners believed that with the Janata governments in power at the Centre and in the states, they now had complete control over the country as a whole, and particularly in rural areas.
3. On the other hand, the rural poor, who were mostly landless labourers and largely belonged to the Scheduled Castes, had become aware of their rights and felt empowered by democracy and adult franchise. They also defended and asserted their rights and benefits under the Twenty-Point Program. Landowners attempted to forcibly reclaim plots that had been given to them in many states, and moneylenders began to reclaim debts that had been cancelled during the Emergency. As a result, caste tensions and violent attacks on Scheduled Castes have become widespread in North India, with one early example being the killing and torching of Harijans in Belchi, Bihar, in July 1977.
4. There was a resurgence of widespread communal violence. Colleges and universities were particularly affected by rising agitations, lawlessness, and violence, which often resulted in their closure. A wave of strikes and mutinies by police and paramilitary forces erupted in the middle of 1979.
5. The Janata regime then explicitly rejected Nehru's vision of rapid economic growth based on large-scale industry, modern agriculture, and advanced science and technology. However, it failed to develop any alternative economic or political development strategy or model to address the problems of economic underdevelopment.
Janata's economic policy merely acted as a buffer between rural development and industrial growth. This policy was built on three pillars:
1. Labour-intensive small-scale industry in place of large-scale industry;
2. Decentralization in place of national planning;
3. Rich peasant-led agricultural development based on generous subsidies, land revenue reductions, and a massive shift of resources from industry to the rural sector. This shift in economic policy was a recipe for slow or nonexistent economic growth.
Failure of janta government to meet expectation of government:
• Surprisingly, the Janata Party made no attempt to meet its previous radical demands for land reform and higher wages for agricultural laborers. The one positive economic step taken by the Janata government was to provide employment to the unemployed in rural areas through the ‘Food for Work' programme, which was used to improve village infrastructure such as roads and school buildings, and which was particularly well implemented by the CPM government in West Bengal.
• After the first year of Janata rule, the economy began to sag, with agriculture and industry both stagnating and growing at low rates. In 1978 and 1979, agricultural production was harmed by severe drought and devastating floods in several states. Foodgrain stocks had been depleted by the "Food for Work" programme, so prices began to rise sharply. Petroleum and petroleum products prices have risen sharply on a global scale once again.
• The heavy deficit-financing in Charan Singh's 1979 budget, which he presented as finance minister, had a significant inflationary impact. In 1979, there were widespread shortages of kerosene and other daily necessities. Inflation had risen to more than 20% by the end of the year.
• The Janata government's tenure was too brief to have much of an impact on India's foreign policy, though it did try to reorient it while operating within the existing, widely accepted framework. It spoke of ‘genuine non-alignment,' which meant bolstering ties with the United States and the United Kingdom while tempering ties with the Soviet Union. The Janata leaders appear to have been preoccupied with keeping the party together.
• By 1978-79, the government, already disintegrating by the end of 1977, was completely paralyzed by constant bickering and infighting within the party, both at the national level and in the states. Each political component attempted to encroach on as much political and administrative territory as possible.
• The Jan Sangh attempted to promote its communal agenda through textbooks and recruitment to the official media, educational institutions, and the police in the ideological sphere. The Janata Party remained a coalition of various parties and groups, and its leaders were victims of factionalism, manipulation, and personal ambitions.
The various constituents were too historically, ideologically, and programmatically diverse, united only by a dislike for Indira Gandhi and a desire for power. With ninety MPs, Jan Sangh was a populist with umbilical ties to RSS, which provided cadres and ideology and was unwilling to let it be absorbed into or integrated with other parties. Congress (O) was conservative and had a mentality similar to Congress. BLD was a secular party, but it was primarily a rich-peasant one with no pan-India or developmental agenda. Except in Bihar, the Socialists were largely ideology-free and rootless.