The Simla Conference And Jinnah’s Communal Blackmail

The Government was torn between forming an Interim Government with the Congress and waiting for the League to agree to the plan. Wavell, who had taken the second course at the Simla Conference the previous year, preferred to do so again. However, His Majesty's Government, particularly the Secretary of State, argued that getting Congress's cooperation was critical. Thus, on September 2, 1946, the Interim Government was formed solely of Congress members, with Nehru as de facto leader. This was in direct opposition to the League's demand that all settlements be acceptable to it. 

 

The British took a different stance in 1946, in keeping with their strategic interests in the post-independence Indian subcontinent, than they had previously, encouraging communal forces and denying the legitimacy of nationalism and the Congress's representative nature. 

 

•    The continuation of rule necessitated one stance, while withdrawal and post-imperial ties necessitated the opposite. Jinnah, on the other hand, had no intention of allowing the British to abandon their history.

 

•    Jinnah had become "accountable to the street's larger electorate." Lekar rahenge Pakistan, Larke lenge Pakistan, goes the battle cry. 

 

•    On August 16, 1946, Muslim communal groups in Calcutta sparked a communal riot.

 

•    Hindu communal groups retaliated in kind, claiming 5000 lives in the process. The British authorities were concerned that they had lost control of the "Frankenstein monster" that they had helped to create, but they believed it was too late to tame it. 

 

•    Jinnah's ability to incite civil war frightened them into appeasing the League. Wavell quickly incorporated the League into the Interim Government on October 26, 1946, despite the League's refusal to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan's short or long-term provisions and its policy of direct action. 

 

•    Without the League's presence in the Government, the Secretary of State argued, civil war would have been unavoidable. Jinnah had managed to keep the British under his control. Almost from the time the League members were sworn in, the Congress demanded that the British persuade the League to change its attitude in the Interim Government or quit. 

 

•    Except for Liaqat Ali Khan, all of the League's nominees were second-raters, indicating that the issue was power rather than national leadership. 

 

•    Jinnah realized that leaving the administration in the hands of the Congress would be fatal, so he sought a position in the government to fight for Pakistan. For him, the Interim Government was just another way of continuing the civil war. 

 

•    League ministers questioned Congress members' actions, including appointments, and refused to attend the informal meetings that Nehru had devised to reach decisions without consulting Wavell. Their disruptive tactics convinced Congress leaders that the Interim Government was a waste of time as a test of Congress-League cooperation. 

 

•    They managed to hold on until the Viceroy received a letter from nine members of the Interim Government demanding that the League members resign on February 5, 1947. The League's demand for the Constituent Assembly's dissolution, which had met for the first time on December 9, 1946, proved to be the final straw. 

 

•    It had previously refused to join the constituent Assembly, despite assurances from the British government in a statement issued on December 6, 1946, that the League's interpretation of grouping was correct. Jinnah appeared to be attempting to make a direct bid for Pakistan rather than through the Mission Plan.

 

•    The statement made by Attlee in Parliament on February 20, 1947, temporarily defused the escalating crisis. The date for the British withdrawal from India was set for 30 June 1948, and Lord Mountbatten was appointed as the new Viceroy. The hope was that the deadline would jolt the parties into agreement on the main issue, averting the looming constitutional crisis. 

 

•    Furthermore, Indians would be persuaded that the British were serious about granting independence; however, both of these hopes were incorporated into the terminal date concept after it had been accepted. 

 

•    The Attlee government accepted the need for a deadline because they couldn't deny Wavell's assessment that the government's authority was eroding irreversibly. They had the option of dismissing the Viceroy on the basis of his pessimism, which they did in the most uncourteous manner possible. 

 

•    Before Wavell even knew about it, the news was making the rounds in New Delhi. But they couldn't deny that what he said was true. As a result, the statement of February 20th was essentially an acceptance of Viceroy Wavell's assessment of the Indian situation. 

 

•    The prospect of being free of imperial rule lifted the gloom that had settled over the country as a result of constant internal strife. The statement was greeted enthusiastically in Congress circles as a final proof of the British commitment to withdraw. 

 

•    The provision that power would be transferred to more than one central government if the Constituent Assembly was not fully representative (i.e. if Muslim majority provinces did not join) implied partition of the country. Even so, the Congress was satisfied because it meant that the existing Assembly could proceed with drafting a constitution for the areas represented. It provided a way out of the current impasse, in which the League not only refused to join the Constituent Assembly, but also demanded its dissolution.

 

•    He was the last Viceroy, and he was in charge of disbanding the Raj by June 30, 1948. 

 

•    The time limit was allegedly introduced by Mountbatten into the 20 February settlement: ‘I made the great point about it.' I had thought of the time and I had great difficulty in bringing him (Attlee) upto it. . I think the time limit was fundamental. I believe if I’d gone out without a time limit, I’d still be there.” This is so obviously false that it should not need to be refuted, but Lapierre and Collins in Freedom at Midnight and others have passed off Mountbatten's self-proclamations of single-handedly determining history as history Mountbatten's self-proclamations. 

 

•    Wavell came up with the idea of a fixed date in the first place, with the 31st of March 1948 being the date by which he expected a stage of responsibility without power to emerge. The target date, according to Attlee, should be mid-1948. Mountbatten insisted on a calendar date, which he received on June 30, 1948.

 

•    Mountbatten's claim to have plenipotentiary powers, allowing him to act without reference to London, is also deceptive. True, he had more independence than the Viceroys before him, and the Labour government gave his opinions due consideration. Despite this, he referred to London at every stage of the development of his Plan, dispatched his aide Ismay to London, and finally went to London himself to persuade Attlee and his Cabinet to accept the 3rd June Plan. 

 

•    Mountbatten did not write his own ticket, as he claims, because he had a clear directive from His Majesty's Government. He was given until October 1947 to investigate the options of unity and division, after which he was to advise His Majesty's Government on the best way to transfer power. 

 

•    He quickly realized that he didn't have much of a choice in this case. Even before he came out, the broad contours of the scenario that was to emerge were discernible. Within two months of his arrival, Mountbatten discovered that more flogging would not advance the Cabinet Mission Plan. 

 

•    It had been a dead horse for a long time. Jinnah was adamant that the Muslims would not accept anything less than independence. Mountbatten was unable to persuade Jinnah to leave his position: ‘He gave the impression that he was not listening.' He was impossible to argue with... He was, what¬ever was said, intent on his Pakistan.”

 

•    The British could only keep India united if they relinquished their role as mediators, attempting to reach an agreement among Indians. 

 

•    Unity required positive intervention in its favor, including a firm hand in putting down communal elements. They chose not to do so. ‘We would have preferred a United India,' Attlee later wrote. Despite our best efforts, we were unable to obtain it.” They did, in fact, take the easy route. 

 

•    A serious attempt to maintain unity would entail aligning with forces that support a unified India while opposing those who oppose it. Rather, they chose to entice both sides into friendly cooperation with Britain on strategic and defense issues. 

 

•    The British preference for a united Indian subcontinent that would be a strong ally in Commonwealth defense was changed to two dominions that would both be Britain's allies and serve the same purpose as a united India. The question now was how India and Pakistan could maintain their friendship.

 

•    The formula devised by Mountbatten was to divide India while maintaining maximum unity. The country would be divided, but so would Punjab and Bengal, resulting in a limited Pakistan that would meet the demands of both the Congress and the League to some extent.

 

•    The League's position on Pakistan was accepted to the extent that it would be established, but the Congress's position on unity would be considered in order to keep Pakistan as small as possible. All of Congress's other demands would be met if they agreed to concede their main point, which is a united India. 

 

•    Mountbatten firmly supported Congress on these issues, whether it was ruling out independence for the princes, unity for Bengal, or Hyderabad joining Pakistan instead of India. He persuaded His Majesty's Government to accept his argument that maintaining good relations with the Congress was critical to India's continued membership in the Commonwealth.