What After Civil Disobedience Movement 1934-35?

Following the withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience Movement, there was a major strategy debate among nationalists. The issue in the first stage of the debate, which took place in 1934-35, was what course the national movement should take in the near future, that is, during its non-mass struggle phase. How was it going to get out of the political quagmire it had become? Two traditional responses were given. 

 

1.    Constructive work: Gandhiji placed a strong emphasis on constructive work in the villages, particularly the revival of traditional village crafts. Constructive work, Gandhiji predicted, would lead to the consolidation of people's power and the mobilisation of millions in the next phase of mass struggle. 

 

2.    Constitutional method: Another group of Congressmen pushed for a return to the constitutional method of struggle and participation in the 1934 elections for the Central Legislative Assembly. 

 

•    The new Swarajists, led this time by Dr. M.A. Ansari, Asaf Ali, Satyamurthy, Bhulabhai Desai, and B.C. Roy, argued that in a period of political apathy and depression, when the Congress could no longer sustain a mass movement, it was necessary to use elections and work in legislative councils to maintain people's political interest and morale. 

 

•    They claimed that this did not imply belief in constitutional politics' ability to achieve freedom. It simply meant establishing a new political front to assist the Congress in strengthening its position, expanding its organisational clout, and preparing the people for the next mass struggle. 

 

C. Rajagopalachari, a former no-changer, advised Gandhiji to take the Swarajist approach, with the caveat that the Congress should take on parliamentary work directly. He claimed that a properly organised parliamentary party would allow the Congress to gain some prestige and confidence among the people, similar to what happened during the short period when the Gandhi-Irwin Pact was in effect. Because the government was opposed to a similar agreement, the movement would benefit from a strong Congress presence in the legislatures.

 

•    However, unlike the 1920s, a third tactical perspective based on a different strategy emerged at this time. Both the council-entry programme and the suspension of civil disobedience and its replacement by the constructive programme were criticised by the strong Left trend that had emerged in the early 1930s. 

 

•    Both, the leftists claimed, would divert attention away from the fundamental issue of colonial rule by side-tracking direct mass action and political work among the masses. 

 

•    Rightist, on the other hand, advocated for the continuation or resumption of the non-constitutional mass movement, believing that the situation remained revolutionary due to the on-going economic crisis and the masses' willingness to fight. 

 

Nehru’s program: Jawaharlal Nehru represented the New Leftist alternative to Gandhi's anti-imperialist programme and strategy at its most cogent and coherent at the time. 

 

•    Accepting Marxism's basic analytical framework, Nehru promoted the Left paradigm in a series of speeches, letters, articles, and books, as well as his Presidential addresses to the Congress sessions in Lucknow and Faizpur in 1936. 

 

•    He stated that the fundamental goal in front of the Indian people, as well as the rest of the world, had to be the abolition of capitalism and the establishment of socialism.

 

•    The withdrawal of the Civil Disobedience Movement and council entry, as well as the return to constructive programmes, represented a "spiritual defeat" and a surrender of ideals, a retreat from revolutionary to reformist mentality, and a return to the pre-1919 moderate phase, according to Nehru. 

 

•    Worse, it appeared that the Congress was abandoning all social radicalism in favour of "expressing tender concern for every vested interest."

 

•    He claimed that many Congress leaders "preferred to break some people's hearts rather than touch other people's pockets." Hearts, brains, bodies, and human justice and dignity are indeed more valuable and cherished than pockets.” His estrangement from Gandhiji appeared to be complete. In April 1934, he wrote in his jail diary: ‘Our objectives are different, our ideals are different, our spiritual outlook is different and our methods are likely to be different.’

 

•    The way out, according to Nehru, was to understand society's class foundations and the role of class struggle, as well as to "revise vested interests in favour of the masses." This entailed taking up or encouraging peasant and worker economic demands against landlords and capitalists, organising the former in their class organisations — kisan sabhas and trade unions — and allowing them to affiliate with the Congress, allowing them to influence and direct its policies and activities. 

 

•    There could be no genuine anti-imperialist struggle that did not include the masses' class struggle, according to Nehru.

 

•    Throughout these years, Nehru emphasised the inadequacy of existing nationalist ideology and the need to instil a new, socialist or Marxist ideology that would allow people to scientifically study their social situation.

 

•    Jawaharlal Nehru also questioned Gandhi's basic struggle strategy. Phases of a vigorous extra-legal mass movement and confrontation with colonial authority alternate with phases in which direct confrontation is withdrawn, political concessions or reforms, if any, wrested from the colonial regime are willy-nilly worked, and silent political work is carried on among the Gandhian strategy, which may be described as Struggle Truce Struggle (S-T-S'). 

 

•    Both phases of the movement will be used to undermine the colonial regime's twin ideological notions — that British rule benefits Indians and that it is too powerful to be challenged and overthrown — as well as to recruit and train cadres and strengthen the people's ability to struggle. 

 

•    The entire political process of S-T-S' was upward spiralling, with the assumption that the freedom struggle would progress through several stages, culminating in the colonial regime's transfer of power. 

 

•    Nehru disagreed with this strategy, believing that, whatever the case in the past, the Indian national movement had now reached a point where it needed to be in constant confrontation with imperialism until it was overthrown. 

 

•    He accepted that the struggle would face setbacks and ups and downs; however, these should not lead to a passive phase or a stage of compromise or "cooperation" with the colonial framework, which required constant hostility and non-cooperation. 

 

•    According to Nehru, the Congress must maintain a "aggressive direct action policy." This meant that the mass movement should continue even if it was at low ebb or remained on a symbolic level. 

 

•    There could not be a constitutional interlude while the existing constitutional framework was being worked out, and there could not be a diversion from political and economic class issues to the constructive programme. Furthermore, every moment, according to Nehru, came to a point where it threatened the existing order sooner or later. The struggle became unending, and the only way to continue was to use unconstitutional and illegal means. This happened when the people got involved in politics. 

 

•    There was no room for compromise or a half-way house after that. With the Lahore Resolution for Poorna Swaraj, India had reached this stage. There was no other option but to continue the fight indefinitely. As a result, Nehru fought back against any attempts to disband the Civil Disobedience Movement. He warned that this would lead to "some form of compromise with imperialism," which he described as "a betrayal of the cause." As a result, "the only way out is to fight for freedom without compromising, retreating, or faltering." Nehru also slammed the idea of achieving freedom in stages.

 

Many — nationalists with trepidation and British officials with hope — expected a split sooner or later because of the sharp differences between Nehru and the leftists on the one hand and proponents of council-entry on the other. Gandhiji, on the other hand, stepped back into the breach and calmed the situation. Despite believing that Satyagraha was the only way to achieve freedom, he appeased proponents of council-entry by agreeing to their basic demand that they be allowed to enter legislatures. He also defended them against accusations of being second-class citizens. 

 

Parliamentary politics, he claimed, could not lead to freedom, but those large numbers of Congressmen who were unable to offer Satyagraha or devote themselves to constructive work for whatever reason should not be left idle. They could channel their patriotic energies through council work in the absence of a mass movement, as long as they avoided constitutionalism and self-serving behaviour.

 

•    Another segment of the intelligentsia felt alienated from the Congress because of his emphasis on the spinning wheel as the nation's "second lung," on Harijan work based on moral and religious principles, and other aspects of the constructive programme.

 

•    Similarly, the socialist movement led by Jawaharlal Nehru was growing in influence and importance, but he disagreed with it fundamentally. The weight of his personality, however, constrained the Socialists. ‘But, because of the moral pressure I may be able to exert, I would not suppress the spread of the ideas propounded in their literature,' he said. As a result, ‘for me to dominate the Congress in spite of these fundamental differences is almost a species of violence that I must refrain from,' he says of both groups. 

 

•    As a result, in October 1934, he announced his resignation from the Congress, stating that he had resigned "only to better serve it in thought, word, and deed." Nehru and the Socialists reacted with similar patriotism. While opponents of the Congress hoped that their radicalism would cause them to break away from the body, they already had their priorities set. 

 

•    C Rajagopalachari wrote: ‘The British, perhaps, hope for a quarrel among Congressmen over this (socialism). But we hope to disappoint them.” In November 1934, the Central Legislative Assembly was elected. The Congress won forty-five of the seventy-five elected seats for Indians. Viceroy Willingdon bemoaned, 'singularly unfortunate; a great triumph for little Gandhi.'

 

•    Despite the fact that the government had successfully suppressed the mass movement in 1932-33, it recognised that suppression could only be a temporary solution. In the years ahead, it will not be able to prevent the resurgence of another powerful movement. 

 

•    It was necessary to permanently weaken the movement for this to happen. This could be accomplished if the Congress was internally divided, with large portions of it co-opted or integrated into the colonial constitutional and administrative structures. The colonial policymakers decided that the period of blatant suppression should be followed by a period of constitutional reforms.

 

•    The Act called for the formation of an All-India Federation based on the amalgamation of British Indian provinces and princely states. 

 

•    The Princes, who were to be used to check and counter the nationalists, were to appoint the representatives of the States to the federal legislature directly. The franchise was only available to about one-sixth of the adult population. 

 

•    Defence and foreign affairs would be outside the federal legislature's purview, while the Viceroy would have special authority over other matters. The provinces were supposed to be run under a new system based on provincial autonomy, with elected ministers in charge of all provincial departments. 

 

•    The Governors, who were appointed by the British government, were given special powers once more. They could use their veto power to block legislation and administrative actions, particularly those affecting minorities, civil servants' rights, law and order, and British business interests. 

 

•    The Governor also had the authority to take over and run a province's administration indefinitely. As a result, British political and economic power remained concentrated in their hands, and colonialism was preserved. 

 

•    It was hoped that reforms would restore the political standing of Liberals and other moderates who supported the constitutional path but had fallen out of favour with the public during the Civil Disobedience Movement. 

 

•    Simultaneously, large sections of Congressmen would be convinced of the ineffectiveness of extra-legal means and the efficacy of constitutionalism in light of the movement's severe repression. 

 

•    They'd be weaned off of populist politics and guided toward constitutional politics. It was also hoped that once Congressmen in power had tasted power and distributed patronage, they would be hesitant to return to sacrifice politics.

 

•    Another facet of the colonial strategy was equally intricate and well-executed. Reforms could be used to sow discord and a schism among the demoralised ranks of Congress, dividing them along constitutionalist vs. no constitutionalist and right vs. left lines. 

 

Constitutionalists and right-wingers vs. left lines: It was to be enticed into the parliamentary game through constitutional and other concessions, encouraged to gradually give up agitation politics and coalesce with moderate Liberals, landlords, and other loyalists in working out the constitution, and given the opportunity to increase their weight in the nationalist ranks. 

 

•    It was hoped that the Left and radical elements would see all of this as a compromise with imperialism and abandonment of mass politics, and thus become even more outspoken. 

 

•    The leftists (radicals) would then either break away from the Congress or the rightwing would expel them due to their aggressive anti-Right politics and emphasis on socialism.

 

•    In either case, the Congress would be weakened and divided. Furthermore, because they were isolated from the right-wing and lacked the protection that a united national movement provided, the leftist (radical) elements were vulnerable to police action.

 

•    As part of this strategy, the government reversed its policy of suppressing anti-constitutionalists during 1933-34 in order to weaken the anti-constitutionalist opposition. 

 

•    The government refrained from taking strong action against revolutionary agitation by leftwing Congressmen once divisions between the Left and the Right began to grow within the Congress. From 1935 onwards, this occurred. 

 

•    The government hoped that Nehru's strong attacks on constitutionalists and the right-wing, as well as his powerful advocacy of socialism and the revolutionary overthrow of colonial rule, would cause a schism in the nationalist ranks. 

 

•    Officials believed that Nehru and his followers had gone so far in their radicalism that they would not back down when the AICC and the Lucknow Congress were defeated by the right-wing. 

 

•    Provincial autonomy was also hoped to produce powerful provincial leaders in Congress who would wield administrative power in their own right, gradually learn to protect their administrative prerogatives, and thus become autonomous political power centres. 

 

 As Linlithgow wrote in 1936, ‘our best hope of avoiding a direct clash is in the potency of Provincial Autonomy to destroy the effectiveness of Congress as an All-India instrument of revolution.” Nearly every segment of Indian society opposed the Act of 1935, and the Congress unanimously rejected it. Instead, the Congress demanded the formation of a Constituent Assembly to draught a constitution for an independent India, which would be elected using the adult franchise.

 

Debate regarding accepting office or not: The second stage of the strategy debate took place among Congressmen, who were debating whether or not to accept the office. ‘After enacting the Act of 1935, the British decided to put provincial autonomy into practise right away, and announced the holding of provincial legislature elections in early 1937. 

 

•    Their strategy of co-opting or absorbing the colonial constitutional framework was already in motion. A new political reality confronted the nationalists. They all agreed that the 1935 Act needed to be opposed from the ground up; the question was how to do so in the absence of a mass movement. 

 

•    In the ranks of the Congress leaders, sharp divisions have resurfaced. Of course, everyone agreed that the Congress should fight the upcoming elections on the basis of a detailed political and economic programme, in order to raise people's anti-imperialist awareness. But, after the elections, what was to be done? Should the Congress agree to form the government if it gains a majority in a province? The basic question of the national movement’s strategy, as well as differing perceptions of the current political situation, was discussed. 

 

1.    Jawaharlal Nehru, Subhas Bose, the Congress Socialists, and the Communists were all against accepting office and thus the 1935 Act. Accepting office mean:

 

•    To negate our rejection of it (the 1935 Act) and to stand self-condemned. Because the basic state structure would remain unchanged, it would imply taking on responsibility without power. 

 

•    Second, accepting the office would detract from the revolutionary nature of the movement that has existed since 1919. ‘Whether we seek revolutionary changes in India or (whether) we are working for petty reforms under the aegis of British imperialism,' said Nehru, was at the heart of the issue. 

 

•    Acceptance of the office would imply, in practise, a ‘surrender' to imperialism. The Congress would become engrossed in colonial parliamentary activity, losing sight of the main issues of liberty, economic and social justice, and poverty alleviation. 

 

2.    Those in favour of accepting office pledged to fight the 1935 Act as hard as they could. 

•    They denied being constitutionalists, and they believed that "real work" takes place outside of legislatures, and that work in legislatures had to be a short-term strategy because it could not lead to freedom; instead, a mass struggle outside the legal framework was required. 

 

•    However, they claimed that the objective political situation necessitated a constitutional phase because a mass movement was not an option at the time. 

 

•    In order to change an unfavourable political situation, the Congress should combine mass politics with work in legislatures and ministries. 

 

•    In other words, the choice was between the two alternative strategies of S-T-S' and S-V, rather than between principles. 

 

•    The pro-office acceptance leaders agreed that there were pitfalls to be avoided, and that in-office Congressmen could succumb to bad habits. However, they claimed that the solution was to combat these negative tendencies rather than abandoning offices.

 

•    Furthermore, pro-Government forces should not have access to the administrative field. Even if the Congress refused to take office, other groups and parties were eager to form ministries and use them to undermine nationalism and promote reactionary and communal policies and politics. 

 

•    Finally, despite their limited powers, provincial ministries could be used to promote constructive work, particularly in the areas of village and Harijan development, khadi, prohibition, education, and debt, tax, and rent relief for peasants. 

 

•    The ministerialists' central question was whether accepting an office automatically led to co-option by the colonial state, or whether ministries could be used to counter the colonial strategy. 

 

•    Despite the fact that Gandhiji wrote little on the subject, it appears that during the Working Committee discussions, he opposed office acceptance and proposed a peaceful preparation in the villages for the resumption of civil disobedience. 

 

•    However, by the beginning of 1936, he believed that the latter was still not feasible; as a result, he was willing to give the formation of Congress ministries a try, especially since the party's overwhelming mood supported this path.

 

•    The Congress decided to fight the elections in Lucknow in early 1936 and Faizpur in late 1936, deferring the decision on office acceptance until after the elections. Once again, as in 1922-24 and 1934, both wings of the Congress avoided dividing the party because they had mutual respect and trust in their commitment to the anti-imperialist struggle and were aware of the damage that a split would cause to the movement. 

 

•    Though they were frequently outvoted, the Left fought tooth and nail for acceptance of their position, but they did not go to extremes. 

 

•    In February 1937, the Congress went all out to win elections to provincial assemblies. It reaffirmed its total rejection of the 1935 Act in its election manifesto. 

 

•    It promised the restoration of civil liberties, the release of political prisoners, the abolition of sex and untouchability disabilities, a radical transformation of the agrarian system, significant rent and revenue reductions, the reduction of rural debts, the provision of cheap credit, and the right to form trade unions and strike. 

 

•    The election campaign of the Congress drew a large turnout and reawakened people's political awareness and energy. 

 

•    Nehru's nationwide election campaign would go down in history. In less than five months, he covered nearly 80,000 kilometres and spoke to more than ten million people, familiarising them with the basic political issues of the time. 

 

•    Gandhiji did not speak at any of the election meetings, despite the fact that he was very much on the minds of the voters. Despite the narrow franchise, the Congress received a massive mandate at the polls. It won 716 of the 1,161 seats it ran for. 

 

•    In most provinces, it had a majority. Bengal, Assam, the NWPF, Punjab, and Sind were the only exceptions, and in the first three, it was the largest single political party. 

 

•    The Congress's reputation as a viable alternative to the colonial government grew even stronger. The election tour and results encouraged Nehru, lifting him out of despair and allowing him to reconcile himself to the dominant S-T-S strategy.