India’s Relations With Neighbors

India's relations with her neighbors were a top priority for her, and fortunately, she was on good terms with all of them until 1962, with the exception of Pakistan. In 1950, she signed a Treaty of Peace and Friendship with Nepal, which gave Nepal unrestricted commercial transit through India and guaranteed Nepal's total sovereignty while holding both countries responsible for the security of the other. The issue of Indian settlers and a long uncharted border were also resolved amicably in Burma. The issue of Tamil settlers in Sri Lanka was more difficult to resolve, and tensions persisted, but they did not flare up during this time period, and otherwise friendly relations were maintained. However, serious problems arose with Pakistan and, later, with China, and the two countries' relations are discussed in detail below.

 

Congress leaders had reluctantly agreed to India's partition as a solution to an intractable problem and in the hope of ending the hostility. However, the enmity was only transferred to the international arena. Communal riots and massive population transfers had already strained relations, but the Pakistani invasion of Kashmir in October 1947, just two months after independence, set off a chain of events whose latest act was only recently played out in Kargil. 

•    When the British left, most of the Indian states ruled indirectly by the British but nominally by Indian princes joined India or Pakistan, averting the very real threat of Balkanization, which the British had almost encouraged. 

 

•    However, a few states, some of whose rulers, encouraged by British officers and Pakistan, harbored grandiose but unattainable independence ambitions, clung on for a while. Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Kashmir were among them. Because they were surrounded by Indian Territory, Hyderabad and Junagadh had little choice. 

 

•    Kashmir, on the other hand, had a Pakistani border, a majority Muslim population, a Hindu ruler, and a radical popular democratic movement led by Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference, which was close to Nehru and the Congress—enough potent ingredients for trouble. 

 

•    The Maharaja requested a one-year standstill agreement to allow him to make his decision. Pakistan formally accepted his request, and while India had yet to respond, its position had always been that the wishes of the people should be determined through elections, and that it was willing to wait and accept the election results. 

 

•    Pakistan, clearly concerned that the popular verdict in Kashmir would not be in its favor, decided to act first and sent in so-called tribesmen from the Frontier province to invade Kashmir, aided by regular armed forces. The Maharaja requested assistance from India, but India could only send in troops if Kashmir agreed to join India. 

 

•    The Maharaja, like hundreds of other rulers, signed the Instrument of Accession, which was the only legal requirement, and Kashmir became a part of India. Just in time, Indian troops arrived in Srinagar, saving the capital city from falling into the hands of the invaders.

 

•    India repelled the Pakistani "volunteers" and filed a complaint with the United Nations against Pakistani aggression. Instead of receiving justice, India received her first lesson in Cold War politics there. Encouraged by the British, who maintained a resentment of the Congress and India and a fondness for the Muslim League and Pakistan, as well as for strategic reasons of wanting Pakistan to be a frontline state against the Soviet Union, the United States also backed Pakistan. 

 

•    The Soviet Union had not yet decided whether India was still a "running dog of British imperialism," so it provided no assistance. Despite the fact that the military situation favored India, India dutifully accepted the UN resolution calling for a ceasefire. Nehru was heavily chastised later for going to the United Nations and proposing a plebiscite.

 

•    However, neither criticism is valid, because Pakistan could have gone to the United Nations if India had not, and the UN could have requested a plebiscite. Because it is not widely known, the UN resolution of August 1948 laid down two preconditions for holding a plebiscite, India has been misunderstood on its later refusal to hold one.

 

a.    Pakistan should withdraw its forces from Jammu and Kashmir,

b.    Srinagar administration's authority over the entire state should be restored. 

 

•    These conditions were never met, and Kashmir went on to hold elections for its Constituent Assembly, which voted in favor of India's accession. The Indian government now claims that the vote of the Constituent Assembly is sufficient to replace a plebiscite. 

 

•    Kashmir later voted in both the Indian general elections and its own state elections, effectively rendering the plebiscite debate moot. In any case, India had never accepted the two-nation theory that all Muslims owed allegiance to the Muslim League and that all Muslim majority areas belonged to Pakistan, and that Kashmir should be handed over to Pakistan on that basis—a Pakistani argument that often appealed to western observers unfamiliar with Indian national history.

 

•    In 1953-54, there was a brief period when it appeared that the Kashmir issue might be resolved. Following cordial visits between Mohammed Ali Bogra and Nehru in 1953, a joint communiqué was issued on August 20, 1953, stating that Nehru had agreed to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir. 

 

•    However, the Cold War's political exigencies extinguished the glimmer of hope. Following Korea, the US decided that Indian non-alignment was immoral and that it should provide military aid to Pakistan. While India wanted someone from a small neighboring country to be the Plebiscite Administrator, the name that was proposed was Admiral Nimitz, a senior US service officer. The last glimmer of hope for a compromise vanished.

 

•    CENTO, SEATO, the Baghdad Pact, and a military pact with the US in 1954 were all used to poke India in the UN over the Kashmir issue. India had made it clear that it would not play the US game, while Pakistan was more than willing to do so. (The Muslim League had happily played the British game before independence; its offspring, Pakistan, now did the US bidding.) 

 

•    The anti-imperialist tradition of the Congress was continued.) In this situation, a miracle is required to find a solution to the Kashmir problem. India could only breathe a sigh of relief when the Soviet Union began to recognize the value of Indian non-alignment and openly supported India on Kashmir. Since 1956, the Soviet Union has used its veto power in the UN Security Council to thwart any resolution on Kashmir that India finds unacceptable.

 

•    Through the mid- and late-fifties and early-sixties, India could fend off international pressure on the Kashmir issue with the help of the Soviet Union. However, she found it difficult to withstand US and British pressure after a Chinese attack in 1962 forced her to seek help from the West. 

 

•    Pakistan began aligning with the Chinese in 1962, threatening to engulf India in a pincer movement, which almost materialized in 1971 but did not, much to the disappointment of the United States. 

 

•    Nehru and Indians in general were deeply saddened by the animosity that characterized Indo-Pak relations. Cooperation between the two countries should have resulted from their shared history, geography, culture, and goal of improving the lives of their impoverished people. 

 

•    Nehru made every effort to remove all other irritants in the relationship, and he was especially generous when it came to dividing pre-Partition assets, compensating refugees, and dividing the Indus basin waters. In 1953, he even paid a visit to Pakistan. A little-known storey exists about a large sum of money that India was supposed to give Pakistan as part of the Partition agreement. 

 

•    The Indian government halted the transfer when Pakistan invaded Kashmir. When Gandhiji learned of it, he immediately had it sent to Pakistan, dismissing Nehru and Patel's objections that they were only holding it back for the time being so it wouldn't be used for military purposes. 

 

•    Gandhiji, on the other hand, was a staunch supporter of India's armed defence of Kashmir. It is occasionally asserted that Pakistani foreign policy is superior to ours. 

 

•    It may be useful to recall K.P.S. Menon's remark: Ayub Khan lost his job, Yahya Khan lost his freedom, and Pakistan lost half of its territory as a result of Pakistan's diplomacy.

 

•    From the start, India has pursued a policy of friendship with China. The Congress had been sympathetic to China's anti-imperialist struggle, sending a medical mission to the country in the 1930s and calling for a boycott of Japanese goods in protest of Japan's occupation of China. 

 

•    On January 1, 1950, India was the first country to recognize the new People's Republic of China. With their shared experience of suffering at the hands of colonial powers and common problems of poverty and underdevelopment, Nehru hoped that the two countries would band together to give Asia its rightful place in the world. 

 

•    Nehru pushed for Communist China's representation in the UN Security Council, opposed the US position in the Korean War, and worked hard to bring about a peace in Korea. 

 

•    When China occupied Tibet in 1950, India was dissatisfied that it had not been taken into confidence, but it did not question China's rights over Tibet because Tibet had been subjugated by China many times before. In 1954, India and China signed a treaty in which India acknowledged China's rights to Tibet and the two countries agreed to follow the Panch Sheel principles in their bilateral relations. 

 

•    At the time, disagreements over border delineation were discussed, but China claimed that it had not yet studied the old Kuomintang maps and that they could be resolved later.

 

•    Relations remained cordial, and Nehru went to great lengths at the Bandung Conference to project China and Chou En-lai. However, in 1959, Tibet experienced a major uprising, and the Dalai Lama, along with thousands of other Tibetans, fled the country. He was granted asylum in India, but was barred from forming a government-in-exile and from engaging in political activities. Nonetheless, the Chinese were dissatisfied. 

 

•    In October 1959, Chinese soldiers opened fire on an Indian patrol near the Kongka Pass in Ladakh, killing five Indian police officers and capturing a dozen others. The two governments exchanged letters, but they were unable to find a common ground. Then, in April 1960, Chou En-lai was invited to Delhi for talks, but no progress could be made, so it was decided to let officials work out the details first.

 

•    Chinese forces attacked the Thagla ridge on September 8, 1962, and dislodged Indian troops, but it was dismissed as a minor incident. After attending a conference in London, Nehru returned home and left for Colombo on October 12th. A week later, the Chinese army launched a massive attack in the eastern sector of NEFA, or what is now Arunachal Pradesh, and overran Indian posts. 

 

•    The Indian army commander in NEFA fled without putting up any resistance, allowing China to walk right in. On the 20th of October, the Chinese captured thirteen forward posts in the Galwan valley, putting the Chushul airstrip in jeopardy. 

 

•    There was widespread outrage and concern in the country about Chinese intentions. The Chinese were expected to rush into the plains and occupy Assam, as well as possibly other parts of India. 

 

•    On November 9, Nehru wrote two letters to President John F. Kennedy, describing the situation as "really desperate" and requesting broad military assistance. He also requested help from the United Kingdom. The Chinese declared a unilateral withdrawal twenty-four hours later, and the Chinese dragon vanished from sight, as unexpectedly as it had appeared, leaving behind a heartbroken friend and a confused and disoriented people.

 

•    The Aftermath-It took India a long time to recover from the blow to its self-esteem, and it was perhaps only the victory over Pakistan in the Bangladesh war, in which China and the United States backed Pakistan, that the sense of self-worth was restored. 

 

•    Nehru never fully recovered from the blow, and it is likely that it hastened his death in May 1964. Worse, at the pinnacle of his illustrious career, he was targeted by political foes who would never have dared to attack him otherwise. Krishna Menon, a long-time associate and then-Defense Minister, was forced to be sacrificed. 

 

•    For a time, it appeared that his policy of non-alignment, which he had nurtured with such care, would not be able to withstand the body-blow delivered by a friend. The irony was that it was derailed by a socialist government rather than a capitalist one. 

 

•    Nehru was roundly chastised by right-wing and pro-Western forces. They took advantage of the opportunity to defeat a constitutional amendment aimed at bolstering land ceiling legislation. The Third Plan was severely harmed, and resources were diverted to defense. The Congress lost three consecutive parliamentary by-elections, and Nehru faced his first no-confidence motion in August 1963.

 

•    The Chinese attack had a significant impact on India's relations with other countries, as the "China factor" loomed large in foreign policy. The United States and the United Kingdom had responded positively to the crisis with assistance, and they could not be dismissed once the crisis had passed. They tried, with Pakistani encouragement, to exploit India's weakness in Kashmir by implying a large-scale trade in military aid, but Nehru managed to withstand the pressure. These countries were also not willing to truly underwrite massive aid in exchange for abandoning nonalignment. 

 

•    The figures mentioned were in the $60-120 million range, not exactly princely sums! However, US influence grew significantly, particularly in military matters. In the name of countering the Chinese threat, US intelligence agencies developed links and even planted a nuclear-powered device in the Himalayas to monitor Chinese military activities. 

 

•    Nehru tried to counter this subtly by pressing ahead with military agreements with the Soviets, who in the end proved to be far more willing to give India what she needed in the long run than the US, which imposed impossible conditions for meagre aid. Pakistan allied with China, believing India to be seriously weakened, and launched the 1965 war.

 

•    Attempts were made at the time of the attack, and later, in the press and academic writing, to blame Nehru for Chinese deception. One school of thought portrays him as a naive fool who was blinded by emotion and failed to protect Indian interests in the face of Communist betrayal. 

 

•    Another viewpoint, espoused most notably by Neville Maxwell in India's China War, portrays Nehru as an obstinate nationalist who, despite jingoist public pressure, refused to settle the border dispute with China on the very reasonable terms offered by the Chinese, opting instead for a "forward policy" beginning in 1959, which provoked the Chinese to attack in self-defense. Neither perspective captures the depth of Nehru's understanding of China or the nuance of his policy.

 

•    Nehru's knowledge of Chinese history, as well as the history of revolutions, particularly the Russian revolution, had persuaded him that China should not be isolated and pushed into a corner, but rather should be welcomed into the international community and its revolution humanized. 

 

•    With Pakistan already being hostile, India didn't need another adversary. Preparing for two fronts of war would have put a stop to development. As a result, even if the conflict is unavoidable, it should be postponed as much as possible by taking a friendly stance and encouraging others to do the same, such as by attempting to get China into the UN. 

 

•    He realized that China's occupation of Tibet meant a shared border, with all the conflicts that entails. However, he recognized that China could not consider expansionism at this time because it faced significant challenges. He was well aware of the dangers after the Tibetan uprising, the Dalai Lama's arrival, and the border clashes.

 

•    Most commentators now agree that India's defeat in 1962 was not caused by Nehru's naive faith in Chinese friendship and utopian pacifism, which resulted in a neglect of India's defense preparedness. In contrast, the Indian Armed Forces increased from 280,000 to 550,000 men between 1949 and 1962, and the Indian Air Force increased from seven combat squadrons in 1947 to nineteen by 1962. 

 

•    The Chinese, for their part, withdrew almost as quickly as they had arrived, having accomplished their goal of humiliating India by making a brief but deep foray into Indian territory. The Indian side had once again failed to anticipate the Chinese withdrawal and was now preparing for a full-scale war in Assam's plains.

 

•    Tibet had been attempted to be integrated by every strong Chinese government. Tibet, on the other hand, desired independence. Nonetheless, in the 1954 Panch Sheel agreement, Nehru accepted the Chinese position on Tibet without even receiving a quid pro quo on the border, which may have been a mistake. Chou En-lai only claimed territory in Ladakh and NEFA in 1959, following the Khampa revolt and the Dalai Lama's flight to India with a large number of refugees. 

 

•    China accused India of inciting the Dalai Lama's assassination and objected to the Dalai Lama's asylum. No Indian government could have refused asylum, and the rebellion was not started by India. Nehru forbade the establishment of a Tibetan government-in-exile or any political activities in Tibet. But he couldn't have stopped the Tibetan uprising! Despite his best efforts, Nehru was unable to influence US policy. 

 

•    The United States' refusal to accommodate China, her insistence that Formosa (later Taiwan) was the only legitimate China, resulting in Communist China being denied a seat on the United Nations Security Council, the attempt to checkmate her in Korea, and Indo-China, all frustrated her and pushed her toward aggressive assertiveness. In fact, the United States played a significant role in making China fearful of its security and assisting the rise of China's extremist left.

 

•    Nehru was also not the architect of Sino-Soviet tensions, which played a role in increasing Chinese insecurity and pushing her toward an adventurist path. These differences had existed for some time, but they were brought to light in 1959. The Soviet Union remained neutral during border clashes between India and China. 

 

•    A number of incidents occurred on the Sino-Soviet border in Sinkiang in April-May 1962. The Chinese accused the Soviets of enticing tens of thousands of their citizens across the border, and the Soviets accused the Chinese of committing more than 5,000 border violations.  

 

•    The biggest reasons is Nehru's fundamental foreign policy thrust. For example, nonalignment ensured that the US and Soviet blocs were not pitted against each other in the India-China war, and India was able to gain greater or lesser sympathy from both. This was a rare occurrence during the Cold War era. 

 

•    Second, even if it ended badly, Nehru was correct in pursuing a policy of friendship with China. Given India's hostile relationship with Pakistan (which began shortly after independence with the Kashmir conflict and grew into a serious threat when exacerbated by the United States' decision to provide military assistance to Pakistan in 1954), it was in India's best interests to avoid having another hostile neighbor and thus being caught in a pincer movement. 

 

•    Nehru did not abandon India's support for China's right to a UN seat, even after the Indo-China war, because he correctly believed that the western powers' isolation of China only pushed her to become more irresponsible. Besides, as Nehru was fond of emphasizing, defense was not only a function of weapons, but also of economic development and self-reliance; otherwise, defense was only skin-deep. 

 

•    India, as a newly independent poor country, could not have afforded to divert its limited resources to building up a massive military machine. Nehru, on the other hand, aided his successors in achieving impressive military victories by bolstering India's economic strength.

 

•    The quick course correction that has had to be undertaken every time attempts have been made to move away from Nehru's nonalignment practice attests to the political foresight and pragmatism that informed it.

 

•    The 1965 war with Pakistan was fought with the same equipment, and there was no disaster. Nehru was well aware of the dangers of border clashes with the Chinese, and had been warning about them since 1959. However, neither the political nor the military leadership foresaw the nature of the Chinese attack and were thus caught off guard. 

 

•    Military leaders appear to have considered either border clashes or a full-scale war in Assam's plains, but not the possibility of a limited deep thrust and withdrawal. General Thimayya, the Chief of Staff, believed that a total war with China was impossible because she would have full Soviet support. He, along with other senior officers, does not appear to be aware of Sino-Soviet differences. He also doesn't appear to have considered the Air Force's role "at a time when the Indian Air Force could have swept the skies over Arunachal Pradesh and Tibet without any Chinese opposition." (Nehru requested air cover from the US without consulting his own Air Force.)

 

•    The failure was also attributed to a lack of a proper system of higher defence command and management, as well as a lack of a defence planning system and a flawed civil-military relationship structure. The chiefs of staff were not integrated into the civilian policymaking structure, and instead served as theatre commanders, preparing for the immediate future but not the long-term security environment. 

 

•    Despite Nehru's warnings of trouble with China since 1959, little professional thought had gone into the planning of a Himalayan war. It was a failure of logistics, intelligence (or rather, intelligence analysis), and coordination between different wings such as the Army and the Air Force, among other things. It was a lack of courage on the part of the military commander, who had a stellar record and had previously been decorated, but withdrew without a fight, despite the fact that he could have held out for at least seven days. 

 

•    The Chinese were also irritated that Afro-Asian countries were adopting India's policy of seeking friendship and assistance from both the USSR and the United States, rather than the Chinese policy of maintaining a safe distance from both. They might be able to get their point across by lowering India's status.

 

•    As a result, it's not unreasonable to believe that China's attack on India was motivated by feelings of isolation, abandonment, and frustration rather than by issues between India and China. By attacking India, they may have hoped to depose Nehru or at the very least force India into the western camp, so that the USSR would be forced to reconsider its policy of peaceful coexistence, which the Chinese believed was leading to their isolation. They were unsuccessful on both counts. Indeed, according to V. P. Dutt, Deng Xiaoping later told an Indian delegation, of which he was a member, that Khrushchev was to blame for the 1962 war.

 

•    As a result, the causes of the 1962 attack had less to do with anything Nehru or India did or could have done and more to do with China's own compulsions. After failing to gain US recognition, a UN seat, Afro-Asian leadership, Soviet support on the nuclear issue, or a solution to the border dispute with India, China's politics shifted to the left. It wanted to demonstrate that India's policy of peace and non-alignment was unworkable by humiliating her. 

 

•    The Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence was also a failure. India would be forced to abandon its policy of non-alignment, and other Asian and African countries would follow China's lead. As a result, the cause of India's military humiliation could not be reduced to a failure of Indian foreign policy. It could only be described as one of history's "unpredictable random events."

 

•    When Indira Gandhi took office as Prime Minister in 1966, she believed that relations with the United States and the West could and should be greatly improved. This was due to the fact that, on the one hand, the US had a better understanding of Chinese militancy and had promised assistance if China attacked again. 

 

•    On the other hand, the severe food shortages caused by the drought and the critical economic situation created by the cumulative effect of the two wars in 1962 and 1965 necessitated such assistance. 

 

•    Mrs. Gandhi agreed to devalue the rupee on US advice in order to further this line, even though it is debatable whether doing so would have been in India's best interests. 

 

•    She also travelled to the United States in the hopes of receiving financial assistance, expediting food shipments, and forging new ties. She returned sadder and wiser, having discovered that, despite public claims to the contrary, President Lyndon B. Johnson had deliberately delayed responding to urgent Indian requests for food and other economic assistance. 

 

•    One reason, according to Indira Gandhi, was to put pressure on India to stop criticizing the US bombing of Vietnam. Indira Gandhi, on the other hand, was quick to grasp her lesson. She put India on the road to agricultural independence by implementing the Green Revolution strategy, as well as strengthening the nonalignment movement and Indian autonomy in international affairs, both of which are intertwined. 

 

•    She also gradually improved relations with the Soviet Union, persuading it, through a concerted diplomatic effort in 1966-67, to abandon its policy of treating India and Pakistan on an equal footing and providing Pakistan with military aid. 

 

•    When the Janata government came to power in 1977, it boasted about practicing genuine non-alignment, but soon realized that the earlier article had been sufficient, and reverted to following Nehruvian policies. They began negotiations with the Soviet Union for massive arms deals, which Mrs. Gandhi completed upon her return to power in 1980. They also had to go back on their promise to cut defence spending.

 

•    Rajiv Gandhi, too, quickly realized that his efforts to improve relations with the United States were ineffective, and reverted to a focus on nonalignment, nuclear disarmament, and support for South Africa, among other issues. 

 

•    Non-alignment was not a policy blueprint; it was an approach, a framework, a method, not a straitjacket but a beacon by which the young nation could navigate its way through the night. 

 

•    Non-alignment allows Indian foreign policy to evolve to meet the changing needs of Indian society rather than imposing any rigidity. It did not detract from the close relationship that developed with the Soviet Union beginning in 1954. It also did not prevent India from joining the Commonwealth. 

 

•    In fact, contrary to popular belief, Nehru's internationalist and humanitarian worldview did not lead to any sacrifice of Indian interests or neglect of her defense needs. 

 

•    Nehru was also not a pacifist who refused to use force to protect Indian interests when it became necessary. He ordered the use of force in Kashmir (with Gandhiji's permission), Junagadh, and Hyderabad in 1947-48, and in Goa in 1961. The fact that much of what was dismissed as naive and impractical when first articulated has slowly come to be adopted by the rest of the world demonstrates the visionary nature of Nehru's understanding of international relations. 

 

•    Nuclear disarmament has become a widely accepted and desired goal around the world. Both the United States and the former Soviet Union agreed that a nuclear war would be impossible to win and thus should not be fought. The Shanghai Communique, signed in February 1972, declared that the United States and China's mutual relations would be based on Nehru's Panch Sheel, or Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence.

 

•    The fact that the Chinese were forced to adopt the same principles, promulgated by the same man, that they had betrayed so heartlessly in 1962 when they attacked India, is no small consolation to India. These principles were first enshrined in the India-China Tibet Agreement in 1954, at Nehru's request. 

 

•    In further support of Nehru and Gandhi, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev signed the New Delhi Declaration with Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in November 1996, establishing the principle of nonviolence in international relations and community life within nations. Even conventional wars are becoming increasingly recognized as being too destructive. Furthermore, they have consistently failed to change borders significantly (as in the Iraq-Iran conflict) or to keep populations under occupation (as in Vietnam, Afghanistan, the West Bank, etc.) The only viable ideal is a world free of nuclear weapons and without violence.