Conflict Between Fundamental Rights & Directive Principles
Since the beginning of the Constitution, a conflict has existed between the justiciability of Fundamental Rights and the non-justiciability of Directive Principles on the one hand, and the moral obligation of the state to implement Directive Principles (Article 37) on the other. The Supreme Court ruled in the ChampakamvDorairajan case (1951) that in the event of a conflict between the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles, the former would prevail. It stated that the Directive Principles must be consistent with and operate as a complement to the Fundamental Rights. However, it was also decided that the Parliament could amend the Fundamental Rights by enacting constitutional amendment acts. As a result, the First Amendment Act of 1951, the Fourth Amendment Act of 1955, and the Seventeenth Amendment Act of 1964 were enacted by Congress to implement some of the Directives.
Which Case Highlights Conflict Between Fundamental Rights And Directive Principles?
Following the Supreme Court's decision in the Golaknath case in 1967, the situation dramatically changed (1967). The Supreme Court ruled in that case that the Parliament could not take away or limit any of the'sacrosanct' Fundamental Rights. In other words, the Court ruled that the Directive Principles cannot be implemented without amending the Fundamental Rights.
The 24th Amendment Act (1971) and the 25th Amendment Act (1972) were enacted in response to the Supreme Court's decision in the Golaknath Case (1967). (1971). The 24th Amendment Act declared that by enacting Constitutional Amendment Acts, Parliament has the power to limit or eliminate any of the Fundamental Rights. The 25th Amendment Act added a new Article 31C to the Constitution, which included the following two clauses:
1. No law attempting to implement the socialistic Directive Principles outlined in Article 39 (b) and (c) shall be declared void on the basis of a violation of the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Article 14 (equality before the law and equal protection under the law), Article 19 (protection of six rights relating to speech, assembly, movement, and so on), or Article 31 (protection of six rights relating to speech, assembly, movement, and so on) (right to property).
2. No law containing a declaration for giving effect to such a policy may be challenged in any court on the basis that it does not do so.
The Supreme Court declared the above second provision of Article 31C unconstitutional and invalid in the Kesavananda Bharati case (1973), arguing that judicial review is a fundamental feature of the Constitution that cannot be taken away. The first provision of Article 31C, however, was found to be constitutional and valid. Later, the 42nd Amendment Act (1976) broadened the scope of Article 31C's first provision by including any law that implements any of the Directive Principles, not just those listed in Article 39 (b) and (c) (c). In other words, the 42nd Amendment Act gave the Directive Principles legal primacy and supremacy over the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14, 19, and 31.
The Supreme Court, however, declared this extension unconstitutional and invalid in the Minerva Mills case (1980). It means that the Directive Principles have been delegated to the Fundamental Rights once more. However, the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Articles 14 and 19 were regarded as secondary to the Directive Principles outlined in Articles 39 (b) and 40. (c). The 44th Amendment Act also repealed Article 31 (right to property) (1978).
The Supreme Court also stated in the Minerva Mills case (1980) that "the Indian Constitution is founded on the bedrock of the balance between Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles." They form the nucleus of a commitment to social revolution. They're like two chariot wheels, one as important as the other. Giving one absolute priority over the other would disrupt the Constitution's balance. This harmony and balance between the two is a fundamental feature of the Constitution's basic structure. The Directive Principles' objectives must be met without jeopardising the use of the tools provided by the Fundamental Rights'.
As a result, the current position is that Fundamental Rights take precedence over Directive Principles. However, this does not rule out the possibility of implementing the Directive Principles. The Directive Principles can be implemented by amending the Fundamental Rights, as long as the amendment does not harm or destroy the Constitution's basic structure.
